Henrique Capriles and the Quiet Campaign

Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Tal Cual Digital (24 May 2012)
BLUF: 
With the local and international media focused on Chavez’s uncertain future, Capriles has quietly continued his grassroots "casa por casa" campaign, which has perhaps begun to capture the attention of Chavez's political base, if not the president himself.
OBSERVED: 
President Hugo Chavez again commanded international and domestic media attention by returning to the airwaves on 22 May after an 11-day absence to receive another round of cancer treatment in Cuba. The event, a purportedly live broadcast of a cabinet meeting, featured the standard, vulgar attacks against opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles, along with promises to bolster Venezuela’s agricultural sector and roll out a new security plan for 2013. The massive state-run media network obliged with the usual and expected fanfare, pairing coverage of Chavez's appearance with ongoing highlights of various polls showing Chavez leading Capriles by 17 to 31 points. Although opposition outlets also duly noted the event, they largely continued to publish the usual extensive editorials attacking Chavez for corruption and “fascism” and debating the validity of polls. Opposition blogs reacted in much the same way, with some limited speculation regarding apparent "inconsistencies" and about whether the event had been pre-recorded in order to more carefully control Chavez’s appearance [see our 4 April 2012 piece, "How to handle rumors of your demise: lessons from Cuba"].

Meanwhile, Capriles’ casa por casa (house by house) tour across several states remained largely under the press radar, even in opposition outlets. However, despite lacking the international spotlight enjoyed by Chavez, the Capriles campaign website revealed a frantic schedule of campaign appearances crisscrossing the country, largely in poor neighborhoods that were traditionally pro-Chavez strongholds. Whether speaking to impoverished communities about the lack of basic services and quality jobs or pledging to indigenous leaders that his government (especially the armed forces) would defend their human rights, the site depicted an unexpectedly warm reception. Capriles' stop in Chavez's birthplace, Barinas, for example, raised some eyebrows among the opposition.

ASSESSMENT: 
Although Capriles’ campaign earned relatively light coverage in both the opposition and state media, there is evidence that his tour may be attracting the attention of the Chavez regime. Comparing Capriles' various campaign stops with the content and timing of certain articles in the state press, for example, seems to reveal a coordinated government media reaction to the Capriles tour. For example, Capriles' 19 and 20 May stops in Puerto Ayacucho (in Amazonas state) during which he spoke to the indigenous community and local woman about their lack of access to basic resources was swiftly followed by a flurry of articles in the state flagship Correo del Orinoco highlighting the government's efforts to provide "basic needs," including education and food. One 21 May piece boasted that under Chavez, the “indigenous have received 1.7 million hectares of land.” Likewise, a 15 May visit to Maracaibo and a 16 May stop in La Cañada de Urdaneta (Zulia) seemingly triggered similar articles that did not mention Capriles but praised Chavista programs offering medical care and social services in the region and calling for greater re-investment of oil profits. Direct coverage in state outlets of Capriles’ visits to these areas were often paired with reports of “aggression” against government journalists from Capriles' “personnel.” Even Chavez’s 22 May TV appearance--focusing on boosting agriculture and overhauling security policies--appeared to echo Capriles’ own campaigning on those issues in preceding weeks.
The low-key, grassroots nature of Capriles’ campaign, perhaps necessary given Chavez’s ever-tightening grip of the national airwaves, may be distorting the reality of the race. Lacking the international attention and vast network of state media at Chavez's disposal, Capriles has adapted by prioritizing personal engagement via social media and face-to-face visits.

The messaging and calendar found on the Capriles' site reveals a campaign directed not at the news media hungry for headlines, but at Chavez's core supporters--the lower class that may not buy newspapers or watch TV news programs. The strategy of targeting individual voters rather than the media could allow the opposition to gain traction among undecided voters and disillusioned Chavez supporters needed to win. Previous candidates, by focusing on anti-Chavez rhetoric, only talked past those voters. Whether or not this new strategy works, it appears to have caught the attention of the Chavez regime, as President Chavez and the state media relentlessly smear Capriles, boast of insurmountably leads in the polls, and--seemingly--co-opt opposition campaign themes.