Energy Security

Kyrgyzstan Frustrated with Status Quo of its Disputed Enclaves with Uzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan | Uzbekistan | Energy Security | Regional Relations and Stability
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
CA-NEWS (14 June 2012)
BLUF: 
Kyrgyz media has reported extensively on recent parliamentary discussions and closed-door hearings on reclaiming gas and oil facilities and reserves in Kyrgyzstan’s disputed Severniy Sokh and Chongara-Galcha enclaves near the ill-delineated border with Uzbekistan, a development likely to exacerbate already bumpy Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations.
OBSERVED: 
Kyrgyz media extensively covered renewed attention to the disputed status of Kyrgyzstan’s Severniy Sokh and Chongara-Galcha enclaves in the southern Batken province. Members of Kyrgyzstan’s parliament this month signaled an urgent interest in addressing the status of the two enclaves, as they  hold recoverable gas and oil reserves as well as subterranean gas storage facilities. Ownership of the enclaves has been under dispute since the 1950s, but Soviet-era authorities largely left resolution of the issue up to the two countries. Because the enclaves are located on Kyrgyz territory, the Kyrgyz government argues they de jure belong to Kyrgyzstan, while Uzbek authorities insist they belong to Uzbekistan and have developed oil and gas fields in the enclaves for years. From Kyrgyzstan's perspective, it was time to return the leased territories to Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz parliament therefore instructed the government to begin using the gas storage in Severniy Sokh and held closed hearings on the issue 14 June 2012. Although these were attended by the Kyrgyz prime minister and other senior members of the government, no official statement was issued.

While not explicitly taking one side or the other, Kyrgyz media mostly reflected the views of Kyrgyz officials who wish to take back the two territories. Citing MP Alla Izmalkova, 24.kg wrote that Kyrgyzstan must define a clear position on the disputed enclaves, for example, by limiting Uzbek citizen admittance to Kyrgyzstan. Her colleague, Akhmatbek Keldibekov, said the Kyrgyz government should have solved the issue long ago, but lacked political will to do so. Another MP, Iskhak Pirmatov, stressed that Kyrgyzstan “does not need to ask its neighbor to give back its dishes" and needed to "take back what legitimately belongs to us.” Kyrgyz energy minister, Askarbek Shadiev, however, warned that Kyrgyzstan did not have evidence that Uzbekistan was taking gas from the Severniy Sokh stores.

Kyrgyz media did not provide criticism of the country’s position on the enclaves or on the views of Uzbek officials. At the same time, Kyrgyz media recognized that jurisdiction over these disputed territories was only part of the bigger problem of a badly delineated border with Uzbekistan. According to another MP, Tokon Mamytov, "300 of the 1,375 kilometers" of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border had not been demarcated, and there are "62 disputed areas."

ASSESSMENT: 
Any action to claim ownership of Severniy Sokh and Chongara-Galcha, especially if the Kyrgyz government does so unilaterally, without negotiation, will only worsen fragile relations between the two countries.
According to the Kyrgyz energy minister, Askarbek Shadiev, the problem of Severniy Sokh could be solved if both countries could settle on a full delineation and demarcation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. Kyrgyz Vice Prime Minister, Shamil Atakhanov, floated the idea last year of possible joint Kyrgyz-Uzbek use of the gas storage in Severniy Sokh. But judging by the Kyrgyz parliament’s impatience to recover the disputed territories, it appears that Kyrgyz officials may seek a less accommodating long-term fix to the status of these enclaves.
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Experts dispel rumors of Georgian involvement in strike on Iran

Georgia | Iran | United States | Political Stability and Governance | Energy Security | Nuclear Energy Programs
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
Tribuna.ge (6 May 2012)
BLUF: 
With US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Georgia, local media relayed messages of US support for Georgian democracy and security, as well as distracting speculation that Washington was pressuring Tbilisi to provide access to its airspace for a possible air strike on Iran.
OBSERVED: 
En route to the International Conference on the Global Fight against Terrorism in Istanbul, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the three South Caucasus states on 4-6 June. Local media coverage of Clinton’s visit to Georgia reported on the agenda: US support for Georgian democracy and reforms, and the need for free and fair elections, and the overall US-Georgia partnership. Georgian media, however, also raised the question of Georgia’s role in a possible US-Iran armed conflict. Ahead of Clinton’s visit, there had been speculation that Washington was pressuring Tbilisi to “distance itself” from Tehran. Several outlets relayed Deputy Foreign Minister Nikoloz Vashakidze's denials, including pro-government 24 Saati, who cited him asserting that Georgia followed all UN resolutions regarding Iran and that Iran had not been the topic of any special discussion. He added, however, that Georgia did maintain ties with Iran in unrestricted economic and cultural spheres, “so there is no problem in this regard.”

Outlets speculated that Washington either intended to request or had already requested permission to use Georgian airspace in the event of a US strike on Iran. News agency GHN spoke about this with political commentator Nika Chitadze, who said he thought the US would not involve Georgia in any such attack because Washington would probably want to use its air force, which it could do more easily from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states than from Georgia. He said using Georgian airspace would require the US to fly over Armenia and Azerbaijan as well, which would pose more problems for the US since Armenia was a Russian ally and shared good relations—and a gas pipeline—with Iran. Even though Baku has tense relations with Tehran, he believed Azerbaijan would likely deny US permission to use its airspace given that approximately four million ethnic Azeris lived in Iran. Political scientist Soso Tsiskarishvili told Tribuna.ge that he thought it unlikely that Clinton’s visit to the Caucasus was connected with plans for an attack on Iran. He believed Georgia would in any case play a “minimal role” in any US-Iran confrontation because he expected Washington would be more likely to turn to Turkey, Israel, or Azerbaijan.

In an interview with the opposition Kviris Palitra, political expert Ramaz Saqvarelidze said the Iran issue could spell bad news for Mikheil Saakashvili's government, which had been developing relatively close ties with Iran. Saqvarelidze warned that with the US demanding partners consolidate around its position on Iran, then “this issue will be more important for Clinton than the fate of Georgian democracy. However, if the Georgian administration remains such a risk factor in this geopolitical process, it is possible that the survival of this administration will no longer be so desirable for America. Democracy might become grounds for the US side to become maximally critical toward Georgia.” Then Clinton might not prove to be a loyal “co-fighter” for democracy after all, he said.

ASSESSMENT: 
Part of the context for this speculation stems from a comment former President Eduard Shevardnadze made in January. In anticipation of Saakashvili’s meeting with President Barack Obama at the White House that month, Shevardnadze told a reporter with Russia’s Kommersant that Saakashvili might be considering involvement in a conflict in Iran as a way to hold onto power. “That could become a catastrophe for our country. War against Iran must not be conducted from our territory.” In that article, a conflict specialist said Georgia would probably “satisfy all US requests,” and if a war began Georgia would be more loyal to Washington than other Iranian neighbors, including Turkey. Tbilisi has long been loyal to Washington for several reasons, but part of society questions whether the price is too high. For example, experts and citizens have asked if the benefit Tbilisi hopes to derive from participation in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan (e.g. support for NATO membership) outweighs the deaths of Georgian troops there.
In addition to running positive stories on Clinton’s visit, both Pirweli.com.ge and Tribuna.ge also reported on the tensions between the United States and Iran. They relayed Tehran’s threats of retaliation, its message that the Iranian nuclear program was for energy, and the opinion that the country that created and first used atomic weapons had no moral right to tell other countries what to do regarding peaceful nuclear energy. This gives the impression that at least some Georgian outlets are trying to maintain a balance between both of its partners.
Saqvarelidze’s comment suggests that he views US support for democracy as insincere. The implication that Washington uses democracy promotion as a tool to further US interests will resonate better with the approximately 34% of Georgians who do not consider their country a democracy, according to an NDI survey. For those who view Saakashvili as un- (or anti-) democratic, the US support he and his administration have received has sometimes been frustrating.
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look to Iranian on energy

Iran | Kyrgyzstan | Tajikistan | Energy Security | Trade and Regional Relations
Thursday, May 31, 2012
Asia-Plus (9 Apr. 2012)
BLUF: 
Given recurring energy shortages in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, media outlets in both countries welcomed their readiness to import natural gas from Iran. But the plan is currently a pipe dream in light of geopolitical, security and logistical obstacles.
OBSERVED: 
Kyrgyz and Tajik media welcomed the readiness of their respective governments to partake in a new pipeline project that would allow them to import natural gas from Iran. Iran hopes to export gas via a new pipeline through Afghanistan, to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and onward to China. Quoting Abdulhussein Bayat from the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and the Iranian Ambassador to Tajikistan Ali Asgar Sherdust, Kyrgyz and Tajik media outlets stressed that negotiations on gas supplies were to start in the nearest future. Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan signed a relevant agreement on building oil, gas and water transportation infrastructure during a meeting on March 25, 2012 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

A Kyrgyz energy expert, Rasul Umbetaliev, commented on the pipeline and noted how Iran and China were the most interested parties. According to him, most of the exports would be destined for China, while Kyrgyzstan, as a transit country, would be lucky to receive its share. That supply would help reduce Kyrgyzstan’s current dependence on gas imports from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Dependence on Uzbek gas was problematic for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as Uzbekistan routinely interrupted supplies to both countries over payment disputes and and other bilateral political and economic differences.

The initiator of the pipeline project was Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon, whose country faced near economic paralysis as a result of gas interruptions from Uzbekistan in April 2012. According to Tajik media, Iran stood ready to help Tajikistan overcome these recurring energy crises if the necessary infrastructure could be built. Citing cultural, linguistic and religious links between the two countries, an independent Tajik journalist, Pairav Chorshanbiev, highlighted how Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reacted to Tajikistan’s energy crisis in April by promptly authorizing emergency fuel supplies. According to Chorshanbiev, Iran pledged its readiness to provide any assistance given Tajikistan’s energy needs. At the same time, there was a sense of wariness about the project’s viability among local observers in light of a call to Central Asian countries to stop cooperation and cut relations with Iran by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Central and South Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, during his visit to Tajikistan at the end of March 2012.

ASSESSMENT: 
Importing gas from Iran in order to lessen their reliance on gas from Uzbekistan would be beneficial to both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan given complicated relations between Uzbekistan and both governments. Lessening their dependence could also begin simplifying relations with a country marked by genera distrust and fraught with issues such as water and border disputes (delineation, visas, and landmines). Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan see Iran as an increasingly important partner for economic cooperation. For example, according to the Tajik minister of economic development, Sharif Rakhimzoda, Iranian investment in Tajikistan’s private sector was 15 million USD in 2011.
The natural gas pipeline idea, however, is not viable in the short term because US sanctions against Iran are a barrier to building the required infrastructure. Although Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon champions the idea, he is hamstrung by economic and political dependence on US support and cannot risk a hostile response from Washington. Despite deepening cultural, economic and political ties in recent years, Tajikistan has maintained an arms length from Iran given that it has refused to remove visa requirements between the two countries and dragged its feet on creating a joint Persian-language television channel. In addition, it actively exported coal to Afghanistan at a time of domestic energy shortage, which stopped only after Uzbekistan cut off gas supplies in April 2012.
At present, the main obstacle are existential security problems and general lawlessness in Afghanistan, through which Iranian gas would need to flow to Central Asia and China. The pipeline logistics are complicated also by difficult regional terrain, including mountainous and seismically-sensitive areas. As the leader and main sponsor, Iran will not have the financial wherewithal to implement such a large project in light of tightening economic sanctions.
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Kazakhstan: Balancing Economic Discontent and Growth

Kazakhstan | Energy Security | Political Stability and Governance
Monday, May 21, 2012
BLUF: 
Kazakh media welcomed a recent forecast by energy consultancy IHS CERA predicting that the country would become the largest producer of oil in Eurasia and the world in the near future. While the boost in oil production in Kazakhstan and high oil prices have benefited the country's coffers, social and economic gaps led to riots and a bloody crackdown on oil workers in Zhanaozen in December 2011, and more recently, a May 2012 strike by copper miners in Zhezkazgan.
OBSERVED: 
Kazakh media reported extensively on a round-table held in Astana at the end of April 2012, at which experts from the international energy consultancy IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) provided a positive forecast for Kazakhstan’s oil production. According to Kazinform, the country was to become a leader in oil output in Eurasia and the world thanks to incremental increases in production, even before its large Kashagan oil field came online by the end of 2012. IHS CERA predicted that Kazakhstan’s share in oil production would increase by 23.5 percent in 20 years. Also, this Central Asian country was expected to step up its oil exports and shift from its primarily western orientation (via Black Sea ports) and look toward eastern and trans-Caspian routes.
Shortly after the release of such an upbeat outlook on Kazakhstan’s oil future, 300 copper miners in the central Kazakh city of Zhezkazgan mounted a three-day labor strike in early May 2012 over low pay. Miners managed to secure an agreement from their employer, Kazakhmys, the eleventh largest copper producer in the world, that would raise wages by 20 percent and not punish them for the strike. The strike unnerved authorities in the wake of oil worker riots in the western town of Zhanaozen last year, which lasted for six months before culminating in a bloody crackdown in December. The worst violence in decades ended with 14 dead and more than 80 injured and demonstrated unprecedented popular discontent over poor living conditions and low pay in the country.

The ongoing trial related to the Zhanaozen events focused mostly on criminal charges brought against policemen accused of using excessive force against protestors. In the official Kazakh media, there was scarce coverage of the incident or criticism of the government’s handling of it. After silencing the protests, the authoritarian government of President Nursultan Nazarbaev placed the blame on foreign actors, calling foreign reporters "evil" for allegedly instigating and participating in the mass unrest. Human rights activists recently insisted on suspending the Zhanaozen trial due to claims that many defendants in custody were tortured and beaten.

ASSESSMENT: 
Due largely to high commodity prices, the Kazakh economy has already been on an upswing after the global economic crisis in 2007-2009. Recent high oil prices have helped an economy that is heavily dependent on oil revenues. Given the fact that the oil sector constitutes over 11 percent of GDP and oil exports reached close to 57 percent of total exports of goods and services in 2010, IHS CERA’s positive forecast regarding Kazakhstan’s oil output will be a massive boon to the country’s economy if it materializes.

It is possible that concern about further Zhanaozen-like unrest prompted Kazakhmys to make immediate concessions to copper miners this May. In light of these two labor strikes—oil workers in Zhanaozen and copper miners in Zhezkazgan—there is an opening, however small, for people to make their voices heard and win concessions from authorities.

The entrenched regime of President Nursultan Nazarbaev, however, who was re-elected by a reported 95.5 percent in April 2011 for another five-year term, is likely to continue its policy of economic expansion while using an iron fist to suppress political dissatisfaction. He expressed this position in his Washington Post article before the presidential election last year, in which he made it clear that his priority was “prosperity before democracy.” Given expanding revenues and a more diverse export market, the government will have resources to continue the policy and fewer incentives to rush political development.
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Tajik-Uzbek Relations On Thin Ice

Tajikistan | Uzbekistan | Energy Security | Regional Relations and Stability
Thursday, May 3, 2012
TJKNews (20 Apr. 2012)
BLUF: 
A heavy blow to the Tajik economy dealt by Uzbekistan’s cutoff of natural gas supplies to its neighbor in April 2012 indicated a new low in relations between the two countries. Local Tajik media blame the worsening dynamic in part on poor personal relations between the presidents of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but serious outstanding disputes over ownership of the Farkhad dam, natural gas, and Tajikistan’s construction of the Rogun dam are only some of the issues complicating bilateral relations.
OBSERVED: 
Tajik media widely criticized Uzbekistan for cutting off natural gas supplies for most of April 2012 and worried about reports that the Uzbek government was moving armed forces and heavy military equipment to its border with Tajikistan. According to TJKNews, the Uzbek government had "sent warning shots to the Tajik economy and signaled a possible demonstration of military force near the disputed Farkhad dam.” Tajik authorities said that Uzbekistan was “consciously provoking social tensions in Tajikistan [as well as] increasing resentment with the local government among Tajiks.”

While relations between the two countries had been worsening over the years, disputes over natural gas and water supplies have reached a new low. Uzbekistan appeared to be working to isolate Tajikistan economically by refusing to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan across Uzbekistan to Tajikistan and by blocking railroad connections between the two countries. The Tajik media saw Tajikistan’s plan to finish the major Rogun dam on the Vakhsh River as central to the crisis. After its completion, the Rogun dam would be the world’s tallest dam and provide more than sufficient supplies of electricity to Tajikistan, which had been facing recurring energy scarcity. Downstream of the hydroelectric facility, Uzbekistan opposed the project due to fear of shortages of water for irrigating its cotton fields during seasonal demand as well as the risk of massive flooding given to the dam’s mountainous location in a seismically active area. The Uzbek government was also no doubt concerned that the dam would allow Tajikistan to use control of the waters of the Vakhsh as a strong lever in any future negotiations with Uzbekistan.

Tajik media also criticized the Tajik president Emomali Rakhmonov for failing to negotiate with Tashkent. Centrasia.ru picked up an article from the Tajik media outlet Asia Plus noting that Tajikistan was too weak to have any leverage over more powerful Uzbekistan and that the best it could do was to continue pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the disputes.

Uzbek media, chose to pay only minor attention to these developments in brief reports. The Uzbek outlet 12.uz, for example, wrote that Uzbekistan resumed gas supplies to Tajikistan on April 16 after an interruption due to Tashkent’s effort to fulfill contractual commitments with China.

ASSESSMENT: 
Although the two countries eventually reached agreement on gas supplies, it was likely a temporary fix as problems run deeper than the dispute over gas. Many Tajik political observers noted the deterioration in personal relations between Rakhmonov and Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov, which appears to have taken on an institutional character. Given the long-standing influence of Uzbekistan on Tajikistan’s domestic affairs, including its involvement in bringing the current administration in Dushanbe to power after the 1997 Tajik civil war, it is likely that the Uzbek leadership will continue to exert pressure on Rakhmon for new concessions.
Tajik media are concerned that Uzbekistan has all the leverage to obtain political and economic concessions from Tajikistan. Because Rogun could help even the strategic imbalance between the two countries while providing no economic benefit for Uzbekistan, it will continue to oppose the dam and increase its pressure on Tajik leadership. As Tajikistan’s fragile economy may not be able to withstand any more shocks, Rakhmon’s government may be forced to delay the Rogun project, even if he is unlikely to give it up entirely due to the dam’s strategic significance as a ticket to energy independence. The project could stall indefinitely If pressure on Tajikistan from Uzbekistan continues.
Worsening of relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan may lead to destabilization of the whole region, which faces delicate ethnic relations between the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz and issues over natural resource use and border delineation. Uzbekistan’s pressure on Tajikistan demonstrated that it can have serious repercussions on the latter’s economy. It is possible that Tajikistan’s deteriorating economic situation and the inability of the government to negotiate with Uzbekistan may create domestic discontent and unrest as well as a tussle for power among various political interests within the country. A country with a civil war legacy may face challenges to unify its political forces if divisions intensify.
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"Nord Stream": Changing Paradigm of Russia-Ukraine Relations

Russia | Ukraine | Energy Security
Monday, April 23, 2012
Rosbalt (1 Jan. 2012)
BLUF: 
With construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline (from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea) wrapping up and service on the second leg of the dual pipeline set to begin in October 2012, prospects for the South Stream pipeline do not seem so illusory. Diversification of Russia's gas export routes could bring upon a new paradigm in Russia’s relationship with Europe and Ukraine.
OBSERVED: 
In the context of the past Ukraine-Russia gas wars and the failure of the two countries to reach an agreement on gas prices, Russian media coverage of the Nord Stream and South Stream construction has been split about the benefits of both pipeline projects for Russia, with differing assessments about the country’s image and goals. The government paper Rossiisskaya Gazeta (RG) emphasized how Nord Stream would allow Russia to avoid "unreliable" transit countries and enable it to lower gas transportation costs and risks. Prime Minister Putin was cited saying that Ukraine would cease to be Russia’s "exclusive transit partner" when the two pipelines are completed. According to Vzgliad (Vz), Russian dependence on Belarus and Ukraine would be minimized and "all the cards will be in the hands of Russia."

Ukraine, which owns most of the infrastructure in the country that carries Russian gas to Europe, is widely portrayed in the press as an unreliable partner that unfairly resorts to practices such as illegal siphoning of Russian gas and refusing to pay its debts. In contrast, Kommersant pictures Ukraine not as the source of the problem, but more as a tool for Russia to gain leverage in its negotiations with the Europeans over the South Stream project. The paper argues that portraying Ukraine as an unreliable transit country helps Russia in its push for European approval and support for the alternative route.

Although the advantages of the new pipelines for Russia are obvious, several Russian media outlets also discuss potential risks. For instance, information agency Rosbalt quoted the Director of the Fund for Energy Politics Konstantin Simonov as pointing out the high cost of the South Stream construction and political uncertainty related to Bulgaria and Turkey, both countries on the planned new transport path. Bulgaria’s bargaining power may be limited since the country would not own the transport infrastructure, but Turkey simply does not see eye to eye with Russia. Turkey is actively lobbying for the construction of Nabucco, the rival pipeline that would bypass Russia altogether and in the process increase Turkey’s political leverage in Europe.

Ukrainian media reaction to the news has been rather reserved. It appeared to downplay the threat of losing transit rights to Russian gas, and overall reflected the official government position on the issue. Kiev’s Komsomolskaya Pravda (KP) reported that Russia’s threats to divert gas delivery through Ukraine were groundless given a recent European Commission requirement limiting Russian exports from the new pipelines. Another outlet, Novyi Region (NR), cited a Naftogaz of Ukraine (the national oil and gas company) spokesman suggesting that Ukraine "should not worry about the completion of Nord Stream's second leg, and should consider the news as a signal for further negotiations on old gas issues in the near future."

ASSESSMENT: 
As Russia and Ukraine continue to blame each other for failed gas deliveries to Europe in the past, each trying to renegotiate transit contracts according to their interests, the completion of the Nord Stream pipeline and launch of the South Stream project could be the beginning of the end of Ukraine’s current importance as a bottleneck for Russian gas exports to Europe. That will change the existing paradigm of Russia-Ukraine relations. Ukraine's value to both Russia and Europe will significantly decrease, with Ukraine in a new and potentially dangerous position of being alone and dependent on Russian gas for its own needs in the absence of alternative gas suppliers.
Russia has clear strategic economic and political incentives for building the new gas export routes. Nord Stream helps Russia consolidate its position in Western Europe as a reliable energy supplier. The South Stream project would do the same, but is also a deliberate attempt by Russia to neutralize the US-supported Nabucco pipeline effort which would allow gas imports unfettered by Russia directly from Central Asia. Russian media has been open about the economic and political incentives of these projects. With the Nord Stream complete, Russia will clearly push ahead with the South Stream project despite questions about the fundamental economic viability of a program that many had once dismissed.
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Japan preparing for potential conflict in Strait of Hormuz

Iran | Energy Security | Regional Military Cooperation | Japan
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Asahi Japan Weekly (6 Mar. 2012)
BLUF: 
Public statements by top Japanese officials over the past month show serious, ongoing consideration of options for securing Japan’s energy supply, ensuring the safety of its citizens, and cooperating with the U.S. and other allies in the event that a serious military conflict erupts over Iran's nuclear program.
OBSERVED: 
Internal government discussion regarding possible Japanese involvement in a military conflict over Iran's nuclear program was revealed to the public on 10 February, when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda told the Diet (the Japanese national legislature) that given Japan’s dependence on foreign energy, it should consider dispatching its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) should “something happen” to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The following day, Sankei Shimbun reported that the SDF had already begun developing a response plan to prepare for a potential blockade of the strait, including the dispatch of MSDF Aegis warships to escort Japanese-owned or operated oil tankers through the strait and to sweep the strait for mines once any conflict was over.

Initially, the Japanese government’s position was that all of this could be authorized under existing laws. On 5 March, however, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister Akihisa Nagashima told a Tokyo symposium that the government was considering a new special measures law to authorize such a dispatch, even though he maintained that the SDF, if necessary, could act before this new law was enacted. That same day, Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka told the House of Representatives Budget Committee that the SDF was also prepared to evacuate Japanese citizens from the Middle East by air should circumstances warrant.

ASSESSMENT: 
Japan needs to protect oil tankers traveling through the Strait of Hormuz given that 85 percent of Japanese crude oil imports pass through that bottleneck. With most of Japan's nuclear reactors--accounting for 30 percent of Japan's former energy supply--still offline and undergoing testing in the wake of last year's devastating tsunami and nuclear disaster, Japan is more reliant than ever on these crude oil imports. However, as the independent Shingestsu News Agency ​notes, escorting Japanese oil tankers through an active blockade from Iran would be much more dangerous than protecting them from Somali pirates, as the MSDF has been doing in recent years. It would involve a serious risk of direct military conflict between Japan and Iran--something that would represent not just a military challenge, but a major constitutional crisis for the Noda administration. 
The precedent for the post-conflict mine sweeping proposal is the 1991 Gulf War. At the time, citing its pacifist Constitution (Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibiting the use of force), Japan made an enormous financial contribution to the U.S.-led coalition instead of dispatching any SDF troops, only to be met with withering international criticism for engaging in "checkbook diplomacy." In response, the Diet passed a new law and authorized the SDF to conduct post-conflict mine sweeping as a way to answer the criticism without violating the Constitution. Six MSDF vessels were eventually sent, but this fact was little noted by the international media. Special Adviser Nagashima's mention of a potential new special measures law indicates that the Noda administration may be considering a further expansion of the SDF's ability to assist any potential U.S.-led operations.
U.S. unilateral sanctions on Iran present an additional challenge for Japan, which imported 8.8 percent of its crude oil from that nation in 2011. The Japanese government has applied for a special waiver on behalf of its businesses, and is currently in talks with the U.S. over how much it would have to cut its Iranian imports to be exempted from U.S. penalties against companies doing business with Iran. However, the Japanese government's ambivalence about these cuts can be seen in the fact that Japanese Ambassador to Iran Kinichi Kumano was cited by the ​Tehran Times as saying on 11 March that Japan would "continue to import as much Iranian crude oil as it needs."
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