Trade and Regional Relations

Russia Turns East: APEC Summit Aftermath

Russia | Regional Relations and Stability | Trade and Regional Relations | Asia | China | Japan
Tuesday, September 25, 2012
Gazeta.ru (7 Sept 2012)
BLUF: 
Russia has been looking to expand avenues for cooperation with Asia, but despite development and investment opportunities, the media remained wary of serious constraints: China’s uneasiness over Russia extending its economic relations to its neighbors, tensions with Japan over the Kuril Islands, and negative domestic attitudes.
OBSERVED: 
At the September APEC summit in Vladivostok, Moscow reiterated its intention to grow its "capital" in the Asia-Pacific (AP) region and strengthen its economic and political presence there. Extensive Russian media coverage of the event represented varied optimistic, cautious, and critical attitudes.

In an interview with Russia Today (RT), Russian President Vladimir Putin described the AP region as “fast and intensively growing” and emphasized that the summit would focus on economic rather than political problems: improving transportation chains and logistics, food security, Russia’s integration into AP markets, investment, and modernization. The Voice of Russia quoted Deputy Director of the Center for Research on APEC Gleb Ivanshentsov who called the summit “the beginning of a big journey” for Russia, comparable to Peter the Great's effort to “cut a window through to Europe” in the early seventeenth century. He also said that the summit had the potential to “open wide the doors for Russia to the Asia-Pacific region.” Ivanshentsov stressed such opportunities as offering AP countries alternative transportation routes to Europe, the potential for grain exports, and cooperation in the energy sector. In an interview with Rossiskaya Gazeta, Andrei Kostin, a member of the Business Consultative Council of Russia, also emphasized how the Chinese and Vietnamese economies were very attractive alternative markets given the ongoing economic crisis in Europe, a view shared by Kommersant Kommersant. Finally, drawing a comparison with western forums, Argumenti Nedeli said that APEC was a unique organization that "sincerely welcomes Russia" and where Russia did not need to "fight" or "defend its interests."

Such optimistic attitudes, however, were tempered by cautious media reminders of the constraints on Russia’s relationships in the AP region. Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenye (NVO) pointed out the complicated fine line of Russian strategy: Balancing relations with China on the one hand, and reaching out to a variety of economies in the region on the other. The latter risks “provoking a negative reaction from China," as it did when the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) signed agreements with New Zealand in 2010. Meanwhile, political analyst Pavel Salin from Global Affairs emphasized the lack of any coherent approach in Russia's inconsistent policy toward the AP region. Analyzing Putin's speech on AP region priorities, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) criticized the president for failing to address topics crucial to investors: development of state institutions and judiciaries, competitiveness, corruption, trade rules, and taxes. Instead, it blamed him for talking about potential areas of cooperation without laying the groundwork for it to happen. Some independent economists assumed that avoiding these “painful issues” demonstrated Putin’s confidence that “his opinion and position will be taken into account anyway.” Finally, political analyst Sergei Karaganov brought up the fear many Russian politicians and citizens have towards China.

Along with these doubts, the Russian media aired domestic criticisms of the cost of the summit, which some outlets considered “unreasonable” in comparison with what Russia stood to gain from it. Gazeta.ru stressed that the approximate cost of the preparations was more than the country’s expenditure for education. In addition, the article noted that the event had not actually provided Russia with any guaranteed benefits. The author argued that Russia's lack of innovation and competitiveness would prevent it from moving deeper into AP markets, and that implementing more “realistic” goals would require major changes in Russian culture and institutions.

ASSESSMENT: 
At the moment, Russian cooperation with its European partners accounts for more than 50 percent of its trade volume, but many there believe that given the EU's uncertain economic prognosis, this volume will stagnate. The Russian government also is not enthusiastic about relations with the U.S. as the two countries have been at odds on various issues and past bilateral talks on modernization and innovation have not yielded positive results. According to Fedor Lukyanov, Russian analyst and editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal, President Putin still feels “deceived by Washington,” because Moscow's gesture of support after 9/11 and the voluntary closing of military facilities in Vietnam and Cuba were not reciprocated by then-US President George W. Bush and he remains skeptical given negative views of Russia in the U.S. Congress. 

Given these circumstances, the “fast growing economies” of the Asian countries justifiably attract Russia’s attention and engender hopes of increasing trade volume in the region, which at the moment accounts for only slightly over 20 percent, with China being a major partner. In addition, Russia has also been looking into reinstating its military base in Vietnam.

Previously, Russia’s moves in the region lacked a systematic approach and produced few encouraging results. The August 2011 visit by North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il, for example, revived Russia’s interest in constructing a pipeline to send gas to South Korea, but the project was dubious considering the unpredictability of North Korean leadership.

Russia’s new “journey” into the AP will require deft diplomatic maneuvering and creativity given the region's disunity and serious territorial disputes, of which Russia is also a part (i.e., the Kuril Islands). However, certain progress was made at the summit, mainly in relations with Japan: The parties signed cooperation agreements and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda was set to visit Russia in December. Considering recent Russia-Japan tensions, Russia may hope this shift could be a promising start towards increasing its regional power, especially with the U.S. and Europe occupied elsewhere. The deep skepticism evident in the Russian media however, suggest Russia's new thrust eastward will not come naturally or easily for the country.

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Kyrgyzstan at Loggerheads Again with Its Major Canadian Gold Mining Investor

Kyrgyzstan | Political Stability and Governance | Trade and Regional Relations
Tuesday, July 3, 2012
BLUF: 
Kyrgyz media reported extensively on the controversy surrounding Kyrgyzstan’s key income earner-–the Kumtor gold mine, which is operated by Canadian mining company Centerra Gold. This week Centerra’s future in Kumtor came under threat due to talk in the Kyrgyz parliament of possible nationalization, which was motivated largely by reported environmental damage and public outcry about its effects. On 27 June, 2012, parliament ruled in favor of revising the existing contract, which could weaken the already shaky investor confidence in the country.
OBSERVED: 
The Kyrgyz government and parliament have been locked in a series of heated discussions about the future of the Canadian Centerra Gold company in Kyrgyzstan’s Kumtor mine, following protests by over 100 members of a national youth movement in late May and early June against reported poor environmental practices at the mine. Kyrgyz media provided extensive coverage of the opposing views of government officials and members of parliament, with some faulting Centerra's poor environmental record and unsafe operations and others placing equal blame on the government for its failure to provide adequate oversight of mining in Kumtor.

After a series of parliamentary hearings on Kumtor in June 2012, many MPs concluded that the mine posed environmental and public health hazards. MP Karganbek Samakov from the Ata Meken party proposed that Kyrgyzstan’s shares in Centerra be increased up to 51 percent, noting that such a measure would be necessary for the country to reduce its vulnerability to price volatility in the wake of a recent drop in the price of Kyrgyzstan’s shares in the company. Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov said that the Kumtor project was subject to corrupt schemes from the beginning, as evidenced by Kyrgyzstan’s shares being cut from 66.7 to 33.3 percent. According to Babanov, due to Kumtor's significance for Kyrgyzstan’s economy, it was necessary to create a state commission to investigate the issues concerning the mine and “find a compromise, and more importantly, [the] right decision that protects the interests of the country.” A leader in the Movement against Corruption, Nazarbek Nyshanov, told 24.kg on 27 June, 2012, that his movement would take to the streets to demand a “100 percent return of the mine to state ownership. Otherwise, we will press for dissolution of the parliament and resignation of the government.”

Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambaev stressed that it was necessary to address issues of the largest gold deposit in the country within the applicable legal framework and ensure protection of the rights of international investors. Atambaev’s Press Secretary Kadyr Toktogulov noted that the latest discussions on Kumtor appeared to be attempts by certain members of parliament to score some political points without taking into account the strategic interests of the country. According to Toktogulov, the “irresponsible attitudes of some people may harm the publicly traded company, shares of which are traded in the Toronto stock exchange.”

Dovetailing this viewpoint, the head of the Association of Miners and Geologists of Kyrgyzstan, Orozbek Duisheev, said that the positions of some MPs on Kumtor were off the mark and aimed at creating a negative impression of Centerra. Duisheev emphasized that all of the problems raised in parliament were well known. The impact of mining on the environment was monitored, and necessary measures were taken to address the problems. According to him, the role of the government in the conflict surrounding Kumtor had been ignored in the parliamentary discussions, in that the government itself had signed the initial agreement with the Canadian company and was in charge of monitoring its environmental impact and reviewing financial reports. In that context, no one brought up the responsibilities of many government agencies overseeing Centerra’s activities, noted Duisheev.

ASSESSMENT: 
Following the violent change of the government and subsequent instability in various parts of the country, including mass ethnic unrest in the south, Kyrgyzstan’s economy has been deeply hurt by the closure of borders with its neighbors and reluctant investors fearing uncertainty. In light of these events, creating favorable conditions for foreign investors and upholding the sanctity of contracts are crucial to Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth, something that most local politicians recognize but fail to put into action. The calls for nationalization of Kumtor will do more harm to the economy than good. Given that Kyrgyzstan has had repeated clashes with Centerra Gold in the past, the latest actions of parliament are bound to hurt both the company and Kyrgyzstan’s ability to maintain investor confidence. Kyrgyz media shared this concern as well, providing viewpoints of the Kyrgyz president and local observers that were critical of the parliament's hard line toward Centerra Gold and potential blowback on Kyrgyzstan. However, for the most part, Kyrgyz media provided straightforward reporting on the Kumtor controversy without taking sides on the debate. 
It is worth noting that Centerra agreed to increase shares of the Kyrgyz government in April 2009 to settle a legal dispute that risked the Kumtor project. Undoing the contract--or as some MPs have suggested, revoking it altogether and nationalizing the mine--would hurt the economy because it is so heavily dependent on Kumtor, which constitutes about 12 percent of the country’s GDP and over half of export revenues and worker remittances from abroad. The nationalization scare and the Kyrgyz parliament's conclusion that Centerra Gold has caused environmental problems for the country swiftly impacted Centerra Gold’s shares, which fell 26 percent in Toronto’s stock exchange on 22 June. Added to that, discussions in the parliament about forcing the company to pay revenues to Kyrgyzstan five years in advance would scare foreign investors if that happened.
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US plans to increase use of U-Tapao naval base rouse Thai media suspicion

United States | Regional Military Cooperation | Trade and Regional Relations | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | China | Thailand
Thursday, June 14, 2012
Luang Lub (7 June 2012)
BLUF: 
News that the US wishes to use the Thai U-Tapao airbase as a logistical hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, coinciding with NASA's plan to use the airport for its atmospheric studies in Southeast Asia, was greeted with suspicion in the conservative Thai press and on social media sites. Most commentators suspected the Pentagon would use U-Tapao as a command center for surveillance operations against China as it expands naval forces in the Pacific region.
OBSERVED: 
The US desire to increase its activity at U-Tapao Thai International Airport in Rayong province was greeted with suspicion in some Thai media. The airport, used heavily by the US during the Vietnam War, and more recently as the logistics hub for the annual combined joint Cobra Gold military training exercises, would serve as a logistical center for US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities in the region. NASA also planned to use the base to conduct its Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS) atmospheric studies.

The 7 June episode of Luang Lub (Thai: Deciphering State Secrets), a television news magazine owned by the conservative and moderately anti-government daily Kom Chad Luek (KCL), analyzed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey's exclusive interview with Suthichai Yoon, a prominent journalist and editor of KC​L's sister publication, the English-daily The Nation. Luang Lub examined an excerpt from the interview, during which General Dempsey confirmed that the US and Thai militaries were “examining concepts” regarding the future use of U-Tapao airbase. He explained that since the airfield was already used for the annual Cobra Gold exercises, it made sense that the US and Thailand would convert U-Tapao into a regional HADR center. Gen. Dempsey reassured Suthichai that the US would not build a permanent base at U-Tapao, and would not use it for “any other military purposes.”

Despite General Dempsey's reassurances, less than two minutes into the interview, Suthichai posited that the US, having access to Clark Air Base in Philippines, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and U-Tapao in Thailand, was formulating a triangular strategy to rebalance US Naval power in the region. Suthichai also questioned Gen. Dempsey over NASA's impending request to use U-Tapao as its base to conduct its SEAC4RS atmospheric studies, which, according to the agency's website, were to take place in August and September. Though General. Dempsey appeared to have fully explained to Suthichai that NASA's project and the Pentagon's plan for U-Tapao were unrelated, the Thai mass media was concerned that, as a part of the US' pivot to Asia policy, the Pentagon planed to establish new US military installations and re-open former bases from the Cold War era. Further, during the one-hour long episode, Luang Lub host Jomquan Laopett discussed the “security concerns” with former Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, Foreign Ministry spokesman Thani Thongphakdi, and opposition Democrat deputy leader Thaworn Saennium. The host also spoke with Defense Minister Air Chief Marshall Sukampol Suwannathat about the lack of transparency of the planned use of U-Tapao by both US military and NASA. The circuitous interview with ACM Sukumpol and his seemingly evasive manner aroused further suspicion in Jomquan, who repeatedly suggested that U-Tapao would revert to a US base, that the presence of US military forces at U-Tapao could cause tension with neighboring countries, and that NASA's atmospheric studies may be used as a cover for the US military.

News of the U-Tapao plans also generated heated discussion on social media websites. For example, a blog post entitled, “How will the US' plan to establish a base at U-Tapao benefit or impact Thailand,” attracted a number of skeptics (and included Nick Ut's famous Associated Press "napalm" photo from the Vietnam War). Posters 14–16 warned that the presence of US troops could threaten relations with China, and turn the area into a terrorist target. Another commentator (8) on the same thread suggested that the US was trying to regain its footing in the region after slowly drifting away over the past decade. In a separate blog post, comment number 14 reminded readers that the US was not well-liked and warned that "Thailand should not do anything to upset China and Myanmar."

ASSESSMENT: 
The bilateral relationship has drifted over the past decade, and the Thai public perception of the US has deteriorated due to mounting trade tensions over intellectual property rights, the failed negotiation of a bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA), and diverging strategic interests. Thailand has also felt snubbed by Washington, holding the view that the US "abandoned” Southeast Asia while conducting the Global War on Terror in the Middle East and resenting how US regional foreign policy has often focused on the Korean Peninsula. Even though U-Tapao has been a de facto hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations over the last several years (including after the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2008 Nargis cyclone in Myanmar, and the 2011 flood in Thailand), many Thais associate U-Tapao with its use by American warplanes flying into combat in Iraq. Thais also remember the base's use during the Vietnam war, and blame the US presence there for the development of some problems near the airbase.

As such, there is a growing distrust among Thais about Washington's “pivot” to Asia policy and US interest in U-Tapao. As shown by the Luang Lub show and Pantip blog posts outlined above, some Thai readers believe the HADR and NASA activities are merely being used by the US as cover for US counterbalancing of China's rising regional military power. Some even revealed that they were conducting research into US defense funding for space programs and the relationship between the US Pentagon and NASA. Many Thais are convinced and worried that U-Tapao will be used for surveillance and military operations against China, the region's rising superpower, and one of Thailand's closest trade and investment partners.

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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan look to Iranian on energy

Iran | Kyrgyzstan | Tajikistan | Energy Security | Trade and Regional Relations
Thursday, May 31, 2012
Asia-Plus (9 Apr. 2012)
BLUF: 
Given recurring energy shortages in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, media outlets in both countries welcomed their readiness to import natural gas from Iran. But the plan is currently a pipe dream in light of geopolitical, security and logistical obstacles.
OBSERVED: 
Kyrgyz and Tajik media welcomed the readiness of their respective governments to partake in a new pipeline project that would allow them to import natural gas from Iran. Iran hopes to export gas via a new pipeline through Afghanistan, to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and onward to China. Quoting Abdulhussein Bayat from the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and the Iranian Ambassador to Tajikistan Ali Asgar Sherdust, Kyrgyz and Tajik media outlets stressed that negotiations on gas supplies were to start in the nearest future. Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan signed a relevant agreement on building oil, gas and water transportation infrastructure during a meeting on March 25, 2012 in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

A Kyrgyz energy expert, Rasul Umbetaliev, commented on the pipeline and noted how Iran and China were the most interested parties. According to him, most of the exports would be destined for China, while Kyrgyzstan, as a transit country, would be lucky to receive its share. That supply would help reduce Kyrgyzstan’s current dependence on gas imports from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Dependence on Uzbek gas was problematic for both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as Uzbekistan routinely interrupted supplies to both countries over payment disputes and and other bilateral political and economic differences.

The initiator of the pipeline project was Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon, whose country faced near economic paralysis as a result of gas interruptions from Uzbekistan in April 2012. According to Tajik media, Iran stood ready to help Tajikistan overcome these recurring energy crises if the necessary infrastructure could be built. Citing cultural, linguistic and religious links between the two countries, an independent Tajik journalist, Pairav Chorshanbiev, highlighted how Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reacted to Tajikistan’s energy crisis in April by promptly authorizing emergency fuel supplies. According to Chorshanbiev, Iran pledged its readiness to provide any assistance given Tajikistan’s energy needs. At the same time, there was a sense of wariness about the project’s viability among local observers in light of a call to Central Asian countries to stop cooperation and cut relations with Iran by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Central and South Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, during his visit to Tajikistan at the end of March 2012.

ASSESSMENT: 
Importing gas from Iran in order to lessen their reliance on gas from Uzbekistan would be beneficial to both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan given complicated relations between Uzbekistan and both governments. Lessening their dependence could also begin simplifying relations with a country marked by genera distrust and fraught with issues such as water and border disputes (delineation, visas, and landmines). Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan see Iran as an increasingly important partner for economic cooperation. For example, according to the Tajik minister of economic development, Sharif Rakhimzoda, Iranian investment in Tajikistan’s private sector was 15 million USD in 2011.
The natural gas pipeline idea, however, is not viable in the short term because US sanctions against Iran are a barrier to building the required infrastructure. Although Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon champions the idea, he is hamstrung by economic and political dependence on US support and cannot risk a hostile response from Washington. Despite deepening cultural, economic and political ties in recent years, Tajikistan has maintained an arms length from Iran given that it has refused to remove visa requirements between the two countries and dragged its feet on creating a joint Persian-language television channel. In addition, it actively exported coal to Afghanistan at a time of domestic energy shortage, which stopped only after Uzbekistan cut off gas supplies in April 2012.
At present, the main obstacle are existential security problems and general lawlessness in Afghanistan, through which Iranian gas would need to flow to Central Asia and China. The pipeline logistics are complicated also by difficult regional terrain, including mountainous and seismically-sensitive areas. As the leader and main sponsor, Iran will not have the financial wherewithal to implement such a large project in light of tightening economic sanctions.
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China responds to US-Japan stationing proposal with naval exercises

Guam | Northern Mariana Islands | United States | Regional Relations and Stability | Regional Military Cooperation | Trade and Regional Relations | China | Japan
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
Sankei Shimbun (17 May 2012)
BLUF: 
According to Japanese Defense Ministry sources, China has directly responded to a recent proposal for the combined stationing and training of US and Japanese forces on US bases in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands by expanding the range of its naval exercises to waters in the vicinity of the islands.
OBSERVED: 
"Until now, they've never come out to this area of the ocean," an unnamed Japanese Defense Ministry official told Sankei Shimbun. Citing the ministry's analysis, the conservative outlet reported that China's aim in expanding the geographic range of its naval exercises to "within several hundred kilometers of the Northern Mariana Islands" is twofold: to strengthen its ability to conduct long-term missions in the open sea as part of its shift from coastal defense to maritime force projection, and to send a message to the US and Japan in response to their combined stationing proposal. [See Exovera's special report, Japan’s new move towards regional defense, for a detailed analysis of the implications of this proposal, which was laid out in last month's US-Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement.]

The Chinese naval exercises, which were also covered by top Japanese television broadcaster NHK, were conducted in the early morning hours of 15 May by two frigates and an Auxiliary General Intelligence (spy) ship, and consisted of the repeated takeoff and landing of a helicopter-type unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from one of the frigates. The three vessels had been in the area since 30 April. Both outlets also noted that beginning on 6 May, a group of five Chinese naval vessels, consisting of missile destroyer(s), frigate(s), and landing craft, also spent several days conducting helicopter exercises about 470 km south of Japan's Okinotori Island.

ASSESSMENT: 
Although the unnamed Defense Ministry official cited by Sankei ​may well be correct that China's naval exercises were intended as a message to Japan, that would qualify as a remarkably subdued reaction from the rising military power--especially when contrasted with China's furious reaction to Japan's September 2010 arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain off the Senkaku Islands. However, at this point the US and Japan have only agreed to consider the combined stationing and training proposal. According to the joint statement, the two sides agreed to "identify specific areas of cooperation in this regard by the end of 2012." China is likely to have a stronger reaction if and when the US and Japan finalize and begin to implement such plans.
After an initial flurry of strong editorial reactions to the combined stationing and training proposal, coverage of and commentary about the proposal in the Japanese press has been remarkably sparse. However, this is not without precedent: Japanese coverage of security issues tends to be driven by official announcements, and there have been no such announcements since the "2+2" meeting of the two nations' foreign and defense ministers. The debate is likely to be rekindled when the Japanese government begins to conduct the review of the proposal required by the joint statement.
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Eurasian Union: Post Soviet Integration Hopes and Limitations

Trade and Regional Relations | Russia | Ukraine
Thursday, May 10, 2012
Zavtra
BLUF: 
Russia officially launched talks in April on the creation of a Eurasian Union. While official Russian sources say the project is "voluntary and non-exclusive" for every state in the "near neighborhood," many remain skeptical about the project's viability given economic disparity among potential members and Russia's troubled relations with its neighbors.
OBSERVED: 
In April, Russia launched a so-called “Eurasian Dialog” that will serve as the platform for official talks on the Eurasian Union, Vladimir Putin's answer to the European Union. Russian media faithfully followed intensified discussions between politicians and economists on the prospects of integration between Russia and other former Soviet states, focusing on the possible structure, goals and limitations of the new organization. Some outlets reflected the official emphasis on the "equal" and "open" nature of the project. Coordinator of the Eurasian Dialog Andrey Klimov, as quoted by the daily Kommersant, described the integration project as a "a union of sovereign states" able to decide for themselves how much sovereignty they would willingly cede “to a supranational level.” According to Klimov, the primary foundation of the Union would be economic, although “some elements" of a "common foreign policy” would be possible in the future. President Dmitry Medvedev said that the Union would be “one of the key players in the global market.” Several outlets reiterated, however, the official statement that Russia's role would differ from that of the Soviet Union, as Moscow was no longer willing to act as "the main sponsor."

Coverage in many cases also conveyed concern about the limitations on integration. President Medvedev, for instance, himself stated that one of the main problems of the Eurasian Union was that key states were "not willing to join it," a reference primarily to Ukraine. Previous media assessments of the Union's viability pointed to the lack of economic equality between would-be member states. The economist Ruslan Grinberg told Izvestia that since Russia’s economy accounted for two-thirds of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), it was not clear how Russia would be able to "cede its dominant economic position in exchange for an equal vote.”

In Ukraine, meanwhile, the media reflected a reserved “wait and see” attitude emanating from its political leadership towards the Eurasian Union project. The online Ukrainskaya Pravda quoted President Yanukovitch saying that "integration is possible," but that it was hard at the moment to see how the project would "meet Ukraine’s national interests.” The daily Komsomolskaya Pravda cited Ukrainian first Deputy Prime Minister, who noted that Ukraine also had other options, such as accession to the European Union. Even a few accounts recognizing the possible economic benefits of eastern integration were overshadowed by skepticism given Russia’s past bullying practices.

ASSESSMENT: 
With Europe fighting an ongoing economic crisis, and the United States preoccupied by an upcoming presidential election (and focused on the Middle East and China), Russia feels it is time to benefit from a diminished Western engagement in the region by exploring economic opportunities in its own neighborhood and historical sphere of influence. The Kremlin sees the integration project as a foreign policy priority reinforcing Russia's role as one of the world's "key players" at the center of a "powerful supranational union."
Russian media reflected mixed attitudes about the Eurasian Union. While supportive coverage focused on existing conditions advantageous for integration, such as common language and past and current experience with economic integration (common currency, customs union), many noted other conditions necessary for the success of the project. For instance, media voiced the opinion that economic integration could become a positive and successful strategy for regional development, provided all members were able to secure and maintain an equal voice in the new organization. More negative narratives were based mostly on deep skepticism about Russia's ability to gain the trust of its neighbors given Russia’s troubled relationship with some of them. Many feared that Russia, due to its dominant position, would only seek to satisfy its own economic and political interests, not via legal decision-making structures, but by circumventing any established checks on its power and reverting to old bullying practices.
As long as the structure and the mechanisms of the future Eurasian Union remain unclear, fear and suspicion will continue to prevail in Russia's backyard. Meanwhile, the EU or NATO are not guarantied alternatives for post Soviet states to turn to either. Ukraine’s deteriorating relations with the Europe over human rights issues, delays in signing its association agreement with the EU, and the EU's own economic and political crisis could weaken Ukraine’s negotiating position with Russia.
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