U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy

Yemen Interventionism: An Exploitative or Irreconcilable Relationship

Thursday, October 11, 2012

BLUF:

Yemeni President Hadi’s acknowledgement that he authorized continued U.S. drone strikes in Yemen generated a heated debate on social and interactive print media. Very few Yemeni’s welcomed his attempt at transparency, and most resented what they viewed as a violation of Yemen’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, extremists and opponents of Hadi labeled him another “American agent” permitting the U.S. unfettered access to Yemeni ground and airspace.

OBSERVED:

As part of his visit to the US during the 67^th session of the UN General Assembly, Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi addressed a group at Washington’s Woodrow Wilson Center on the transition of political, security and economic developments in Yemen. Reiterating the “serious and real threat” of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Hadi issued his first open endorsement of U.S. drones strikes on AQAP targets in Yemen. Hadi stated the “drones’ have high precision” and have “zero margin of error if you know exactly what the target you're aiming at is.” He emphasized the U.S. “has assisted with their drones since the Yemeni Air Force cannot carry out night missions with its aging Soviet-made aircraft,” adding that “drone technology is more advanced than the human brain.”

Hadi’s unreserved acknowledgment came after another squall of anger with the deployment of a U.S. Marine Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Team (FAST) following violent protests against the U.S. Embassy triggered by a U.S.-made film ridiculing Prophet Muhammad. Several prominent Yemeni leaders condemned the U.S. “occupation” and rejected the presence of foreign military forces on Yemeni soil under any circumstance. In addition, sympathizers of Al Qaida exploited the opportunity to call for continued jihad against the “American invader.” Noticeably, most Yemeni media websites clearly exaggerated the real number of deployed U.S. Marines and their equipment, reporting over 250 Marines and 200 armored vehicles. In its effort to calm public anger, government sources denied these numbers, stating that only 50 Marines with 20 armored vehicles entered the country and proceeded to the U.S. Embassy to replace vehicles damaged by protesters.

Anti-U.S. sentiment was also expressed by political and religious leaders, who demanded the government stop any foreign military intervention on Yemeni territory. Journalist Nasser Arrabyee opined that “the majority of Yemenis on Facebook and Twitter had stated that allowing American forces in Yemen would only increase the number Al Qaida terrorists.” Echoing the same sentiment, the Yemeni Parliament unanimously rejected the presence of any foreign military force on its soil for any reason, demanding an immediate departure of U.S. Marines. MP Nabil Al Basha likewise warned “The American Marine forces will only hurt the feelings of Yemenis and give more sympathy to Al Qaida who may take control over Sana’a and turn it into an arena of armed conflict.” Meanwhile, pro-AQAP voices took the opportunity to intensify their media campaign in various websites and social forums. On one popular forum, an extremist writer posted “an invitation for an American barbecue,” where he called on “honorable jihadists” to join him in enjoying the variety of dishes to include ”Marine Barbecue, Marine Pizza and Marine Burgers.” The writer also posted graphic photos of injured Marines, noting that the added sweetness will be “Yemeni army agents.” He claimed the barbecue venue would be held at the Sheraton Hotel where U.S. Marines were located.

ASSESSMENT:

Undoubtedly, Hadi’s transparency has backfired with his domestic audience and provoked more anger than support in a very critical transitional period. While he represents a reliable and (as of yet) sincere partner on counterterrorism operations from a U.S. perspective, his endorsement of U.S. drone strikes was seen by his own countrymen as a “blatant violation of their sovereignty” and fueled claims he heads a “puppet regime” which has granted the U.S. a “license” to kill innocent Yemenis.

His frank endorsement of U.S. drone attacks has also jeopardized his own safety and made him a valuable objective for elimination for AQAP death squads or opponents. According to The Long War Journal, U.S. drone strikes have over tripled since Hadi came into office (from 10 in 2011 to 33 in 2012), leading him to be publicly targeted by AQAP and its allies. In addition, sources in the Yemen Press revealed that former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who openly denied approving U.S. drones and also exploited the AQAP threat as a bargaining chip with the U.S., “has expressed his austere resentment over Hadi to the U.S. and hopes to have Hadi assassinated when he return to Yemen.”

The deployment of the U.S. Marine FAST team and U.S. drone strikes that have injured or killed many Yemeni civilians have remarkably increased anti-U.S. sentiment among the majority of Yemenis. The Editor-in-Chief for the independent Yemen Post Hakim AlMasmari described it this way: “Al Qaida is enjoying the much needed moment of recruitment … The drone is a gift for the terror network … [Because] It is not Jihad that points the tribes in the direction of Al Qaida; rather … It is the revenge for the demise of their loved ones.”

Praise and New Defense Concept for Georgian Armed Forces

Georgia | Turkey | Political Stability and Governance | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

BLUF:

Georgian media recently shined a spotlight on the country’s armed forces and new Defense Minister Dimitri Shashkin’s plans to provide security for both the nation and individual service members. He emphasized the peaceful nature of the new defense concept and its anticipated contribution to NATO integration, but his talk of increased domestic arms production could provoke reactions abroad.

OBSERVED:

With the recent appointment of new Defense Minister Dimitri Shashkin, the Georgian media have highlighted the importance of the country’s armed forces. After Parliament confirmed the new minister on 4 July, President Mikheil Saakashvili praised him as an “idea generator” and “one of the best Georgian patriots,” according to news website Pirweli.com.ge. The president also pointed out that “the armed forces have the most authority among all Georgian state institutions, and this is thanks first of all to our officers, sergeants, and troops.” In a 10 July interview with 24 Saati, Shashkin outlined his plans for strengthening the national defense system, promising that more detailed and concrete information would soon be made available. He said that, similar to the US Army Ranger creed of “Leave No Man Behind,” the Georgian defense system’s new motto would be “No Man Gets Left Behind in Peace or in Wartime.” This fit with what Shashkin referred to as the “three T’s” for the new defense concept being developed: "Total Care," "Total Training," and "Total Defense." The first would take care of every service member and his family, while the second was intended to accelerate NATO integration by stepping up military training and education. Finally, "Total Defense" was a key priority “because we have a difficult neighbor.” He said the increased strength would not be adversarial, since Georgia only wanted to protect its territory. However, Shashkin also spoke of development of the domestic military industry, including weapons production, saying “the existing demand for defensive weapons in the country needs to be satisfied.” In Kviris Palitra, military analyst Irakli Aladashvili welcomed the ideas but reminded leaders that actions were more important than words. Regarding the new motto, Aladashvili remarked, “It makes one think of the soldiers who were indeed abandoned, wounded, and lost in the August 2008 war.”

The Georgian media also covered two high-profile visitors to the Defense Ministry. On 17 July, US Army in Europe Commander Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling and his delegation met with Georgian defense officials in Tbilisi to discuss bilateral cooperation, military education and training, development of military doctrine, and Georgia’s contribution to ISAF operations. At the press conference that followed, Lt. Gen. Hertling thanked Georgia for its participation in peacekeeping and remarked that “impressive and welcome changes” were taking place in the country’s defense system, 24 Saati reported. News agency GHN relayed the general’s high praise for Georgian troops in Afghanistan, who had distinguished themselves by their “bravery, dedication, and professionalism.” He singled out what he considered the selflessness of officer Aleksandre Tughushi, who was gravely wounded in Afghanistan and was now being treated in the United States.

The next day, Shashkin received his Turkish counterpart, National Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz, during the latter’s brief visit to Georgia. According to 24 Saati, the two discussed similar matters such as bilateral cooperation, regional security, and Georgia’s role in the ISAF (Afghanistan) mission. Pirweli.com.ge quoted Shashkin as saying that “Turkey is our country’s strategic partner and friend, which always supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and NATO integration. Turkey always says what it does and does what it says.” Tribuna.ge cited President Saakashvili thanking Turkey for supporting Georgian NATO membership and for maintaining close cooperation with Georgia on defense after the 2008 war, unlike most other countries, he said.

ASSESSMENT:

This positive attention toward Georgia’s armed forces could be seen as part of an effort to increase military recruitment. While describing his plans for the nation’s defense, Shashkin indicated that there could be changes in the policy on mandatory service, which more affluent young men currently may defer by paying a fee: “Everyone must understand us—without mandatory conscription, defense of our country is impossible. We are a very small country. Georgia cannot rely solely on a professional army to protect its territory.” Part of the solution is to expand the country’s reserve forces, something that has been discussed for a while now. He said authorities were considering what sounded like a Georgian version of the US GI Bill, in which the Defense Ministry would finance the education of those who served.

The promise of an otherwise elusive education could have a positive influence on enlistment, along with the message about how brave and vital the country’s young men are to national (and international) security. Such a message could become a more prominent part of any recruitment campaign around the anniversary of the August 2008 war. If successful, the Total Care aspect of the new defense policy should also help enlistment while simultaneously improving the image of the government. In the past, Georgian troops have not always been well provided for, which has led to mutiny and—some say—made them less inclined to support President Eduard Shevardnadze during the Rose Revolution in 2003.

Statements in the monitored press emphasized Georgia’s focus on national defense (as opposed to offensive capabilities) and on NATO membership—its desire “to be protected within the framework of this large international organization.” Plans for Total Defense were directly connected to Tbilisi’s pursuit of membership in the Alliance. The feeling of insecurity in recent years has been due in part to an inability to procure enough defensive weaponry after the 2008 war with Russia, which would make any further Russian aggression even more damaging. Moscow called for an arms embargo on its southern neighbor after the war, but US officials deny the existence of any such restriction. Others have argued there is indeed an unofficial embargo meant to appease Russia. In this context, Saakashvili was quoted earlier this year saying that Georgia “refused to give up” after 2008 and began developing and manufacturing its own weapons and defense systems, some of which have already been unveiled. Increasing domestic arms production would work toward meeting the country’s needs as well as solve another serious problem: unemployment, as Shashkin pointed out. The new minister came across as a thoughtful and competent public servant, but his reference to Russia’s “occupation of twenty percent of our territory” as “temporary” could lead to concerns about Tbilisi’s policy on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other hand, it might have been a sign of optimism.

All mention of the US, NATO, and Turkey regarding the above issues was highly supportive. Outlets praised Lt. Gen. Hertling's military record as officials thanked Washington for its multifaceted support of Georgia. Continuing cooperation with the US and Brussels were clearly priorities, since “these are the most important relationships for us.” Turkey was portrayed as a reliable partner that didn't abandon Georgia after the 2008 war, when other governments ostensibly became reluctant to sell it defensive weapons for fear of Moscow's anger. The emphasis on the strength of Georgia's ties with Washington and Ankara, along with the support it receives from both NATO members, reinforced the impression that Georgia was on its way toward total integration with the Alliance.

Clinton's visit to Cairo: Beyond tomato pelting

Saturday, July 21, 2012

BLUF:

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Cairo was a harbinger of tougher times ahead for US-Egyptian relations as the new openness in the press gives vent to significant irritation with perceived US "meddling" in Egyptian affairs emanating from multiple political camps.

OBSERVED:

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Egypt visit sparked a political debate among Egyptians journalists who continued to speculate on the purpose and substance of her talks with senior Egyptian officials.

Clinton’s visit, the first to Cairo since the election of the new President Mohamed Morsi, was a major event in all top newspapers. State-run outlets typically ran straightforward front-page headlines highlighting Clinton’s meeting with the Egyptian President and Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of Egypt's Military Council. Nevertheless, some state-run media columnists such as Reham Mazen were critical of the visit. For example, Mazen complained that Secretary Clinton referred to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in her statement “even though President and the Military Council have said repeatedly that they will honor the treaty." "So why bring up a subject that was settled," she wrote. The writer agreed with “some Egyptian political parties” that Secretary Clinton’s visit was premature. “We are still trying to rearrange our internal state. Some Egyptians think that we need to pull out the claws of US policy and some think that Egypt has to decide its policy without dictation,” concluded Mazen in her state-run Al Ahram column.

Al Ahram Columnist Hussien Al Zanati tackled a different aspect of Clinton’s visit, focusing on the Coptic Christians’ refusal to meet with Clinton. In his column titled, “Copts Slap Mrs. Clinton,” Al Zanati argued that the Copts had "finally realized" that the US could not be relied upon to defend their interests. “The Copts now believe that there is a alliance between the Muslim Brothers and the US,” said the columnist, adding that Copts had realized like other Egyptians that US handling of Egypt was "reinforcing sectarian divisions.”

Independent media, however, published even harsher reactions to the visit. Columnist Al Bedawi Abdul Azim Badawi, for example, from the daily Al Youm Al Sabaa wrote, “Clinton’s visit is part of the same old approach pursued by successive US administrations when dealing with Egypt,” adding that US military aid to Egypt was a “bribe” with which the US sought “to secure its regional interests.” Mohammad Al Munshawi, writing for Al Shrouk, said Clinton’s goal was to see what kind of foreign policy Egypt’s new leadership had in mind: “Washington wants to know how Morsi is going to handle relations with Israel? Is he going to meet with Israeli officials? How would he respond if they attempted to contact him? Will he maintain the special relationship that Egypt always had with Washington?” Al Munshawi argued that even thought the US continuously threatened to suspend its military aid to Egypt, Washington did not really mean it because it could not afford to lose Egypt as an ally.

Perhaps the harshest reaction came from journalist and former MP (Member of Parliament) Mustafa Bakery. Bakery wrote on his Twitter account that “Clinton's visit to Cairo is meant to express Washington's support for Muslim Brotherhood, and back its call to convene the dissolved Parliament. It is an incitement against the military. The US stances are revealed” He went on to say that “America is the greatest enemy of our Arab and Islamic countries, but we will stand up to all the conspiracies with strength. We will uncover its agents and their schemes.”

Analyst Amr Shubaki who often writes in Al Masry Al Youm saw “nothing new” about the visit, saying the US message was to confirm there would be no radical change between the two countries and to "emphasize the strategic alliance between the two countries and the United States’ support for the Muslim Brotherhood."

Reporting on the protesters in Alexandria who threw tomatoes, insults and shoes at Secretary Clinton's motorcade, some independent newspapers said that the protesters were supporters of Tawif Okasha, a Mubarak regime loyalist. Okasha, who is also the owner of the Faraeen (Pharos) channel, had called for human chains around the American Embassy to protest and reject Clinton's visit. He told protestors to bring eggs and tomatoes with them. In a statement to Copts Today, Okasha said, “Clinton came to Cairo to set up the new Egyptian government.”

ASSESSMENT:

As evident in many op-eds and protests, US policy in Egypt is not popular with a wide spectrum of the Egyptian public. The secular organizations see the visit of Mrs. Clinton as an endorsement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the demonstrations staged against her were organized by secular groups. In addition, Coptic Christian organizations boycotted meeting with Clinton for the same reason. Despite her meeting with the new Muslim Brother President, there was no general acclaim from Islamist quarters either, given deep distrust and historic US support for the Egyptian military.

With a more open Press and mass demonstrations taking place regularly, both government and opposition political leaders in Egypt must tread carefully in dealing with the United States. The political and social upheaval in Egypt has made Egypt more complicated for the US as well, since the days when the US could deal directly with Egyptian leadership and disregard sentiment in the street are gone.

In a more general sense, Egyptian commentators project a belief that the influence of the US in the Middle East in general has diminished. Evident in some columns is the sense that although Egypt needs the US, the US needs Egypt more.

Secretary Clinton's visit demonstrated that trying to straddle the fence between the Muslim Brotherhood's elected government and the Egyptian Army will be a major problem for US diplomacy for the foreseeable future. It is likely to get worse. With power seemingly split between the Brotherhood and military, fierce political competition between the two groups, amid absence of clear rules or political institutions, is likely to only lead to greater and greater political polarization. Both camps may see political advantage in criticizing the US, while paradoxically, the US may have little leverage with either sector. At stake is the peace treaty with Israel, which seems secure for now, but there will be mounting pressure for the new president to do something to meet the heightened expectations of the people. With only limited capabilities of doing so economically, there is always the fear of a populist president using the Palestinian card to ratchet up tension as a diversion.

Thai Military Officials Appear to Temper Enthusiasm for NASA Initiative Ahead of Chinese Defense Chief Visit

Friday, June 22, 2012

BLUF:

Domestic politics, and according to some Thai media, possibly Chinese pressure, has delayed Thailand’s approval of US plans to use the U-Tapao airbase for a major scientific climate study, prompting NASA to demand an answer by 26 June.

OBSERVED:

News of a 14 June agreement to explore the possibility of using the U-Tapao airbase as a regional logistics hub for US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) set off another firestorm in the Thai press [see US Plans to Increase Use of U-Tapao Naval Base Rouse Thai Media Suspicion]. The deal was reached between Thai Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaiku and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the US-Thailand Strategic Dialogue in Washington. As noted in our earlier analysis, the Thai media has linked the US military’s use of U-Tapao for HADR with the previously announced plan to use the base for NASA to conduct its Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS) atmospheric studies. As observed online, some Thai commentators see both projects as part of a US effort to counterbalance China’s growing regional military power.

On 18 June, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinnawatrat met with Thailand’s armed forces chiefs in Pattaya to discuss these plans for U-Tapao. Although the military top brass reportedly agree that US use of the facility would not affect national security, they were evidently unenthusiastic about the deal as most declined to join PM Yingluck’s media conference after the meeting. Opposition outlets had another field day when they discovered that U-Tapao was not a part of the 19 June Cabinet agenda. They accused the Yingluck government of back-pedaling on the plan, but Yingluck insisted her government had merely tabled the discussion until a working committee delivered its report.

These developments coincided with a visit by Chinese defense chief, Commander of the Second Artillery Force Jing Zhiyuan, on 22 June. The government press release on the visit simply stated that Jing Zhiyuan would meet with Thai Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha to discuss “bilateral military relations,” but the populist Daily News and progressive Naewna contended that U-Tapao was on the agenda.

As Thai government and military officials deliberated amid claims of "insufficient information" on NASA's research project and speculation about the US' "real intention for U-Tapao," experts tried to ease public concern by explaining that NASA’s request would benefit Thailand and was unrelated to the US HADR plans. According to scientists from King Mongkut's Institute of Technology (KMIT) Ladkrabang's Chemical Engineering Department, the military had a better understanding of the project than civilian officials. As government approval of NASA's request was delayed, the US agency threatened to withdraw if Bangkok cannot provide an answer by 26 June as NASA needed time to bring in equipment ahead of the studies planned for August.

ASSESSMENT:

To many Thais, the argument that “US plans for U-Tapao will not impact national security” appears dubious, especially with China's defense chief on his way to Thailand to discuss the bilateral military relationship. Critics of US use of U-Tapao argue that the Thai-US deal has obviously unsettled China and that that possibility alone is enough for the deal to be considered an important matter of national security. In spite of the base's existing use as a logistical hub for the annual Cobra Gold military exercise and de facto humanitarian assistance center for SE Asia, Thais still fear that the deployment of “sophisticated scientific equipment, the hosting of spacecraft, and the arrival of military personnel” on Thai soil could cause problems for Thailand's China relations.

This feeling of unease is exacerbated by the perception that the Yingluck government and US Embassy in Bangkok have so far done a poor job of introducing the proposal to the public, causing much confusion and consternation in many quarters. Further, the apparent attempt by the military leadership to distance themselves from the deal, as evidenced by their lack of enthusiasm and refusal to participate in the joint press conference with PM Yingluck, has already been construed by many as either an attempt to cement the military’s image as the “fence of the country” or to downplay their role in the U-Tapao issue in order to preserve good relations with China.

While most critics still oppose them, scientists and government officials have expressed their approval of NASA's atmospheric studies and have actively encouraged the public to consider all the benefits of the US agency's climate mission. They have asserted that the research data collected in the research will allow meteorologists to make more accurate forecasts and help the Thai government prepare for and possibly mitigate flooding, particularly ahead of the August-October monsoon season.

Judging from comments on social media platforms, Thais are beginning to get a better grasp of NASA's proposal, and despite prevailing and ongoing anti-US sentiment, have begun to worry about missing an opportunity if the government fails to meet NASA’s 26 June deadline.

Younger Thais in particular appear unwilling to forfeit scientific progress and access to quality climate information unprecedented for Thailand. Some Thais online also recognize the possibility that the opposition Democrats party (who supported the plan in 2010) may have blown the U-Tapao issue out of proportion for political gain. Some have called on politicians to stop the political games before the country loses the opportunity to host NASA to Cambodia or Singapore.

US plans to increase use of U-Tapao naval base rouse Thai media suspicion

Thursday, June 14, 2012

BLUF:

News that the US wishes to use the Thai U-Tapao airbase as a logistical hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, coinciding with NASA's plan to use the airport for its atmospheric studies in Southeast Asia, was greeted with suspicion in the conservative Thai press and on social media sites. Most commentators suspected the Pentagon would use U-Tapao as a command center for surveillance operations against China as it expands naval forces in the Pacific region.

OBSERVED:

The US desire to increase its activity at U-Tapao Thai International Airport in Rayong province was greeted with suspicion in some Thai media. The airport, used heavily by the US during the Vietnam War, and more recently as the logistics hub for the annual combined joint Cobra Gold military training exercises, would serve as a logistical center for US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities in the region. NASA also planned to use the base to conduct its Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS) atmospheric studies.

The 7 June episode of Luang Lub (Thai: Deciphering State Secrets), a television news magazine owned by the conservative and moderately anti-government daily Kom Chad Luek (KCL), analyzed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey's exclusive interview with Suthichai Yoon, a prominent journalist and editor of KCL's sister publication, the English-daily The Nation. Luang Lub examined an excerpt from the interview, during which General Dempsey confirmed that the US and Thai militaries were “examining concepts” regarding the future use of U-Tapao airbase. He explained that since the airfield was already used for the annual Cobra Gold exercises, it made sense that the US and Thailand would convert U-Tapao into a regional HADR center. Gen. Dempsey reassured Suthichai that the US would not build a permanent base at U-Tapao, and would not use it for “any other military purposes.”

Despite General Dempsey's reassurances, less than two minutes into the interview, Suthichai posited that the US, having access to Clark Air Base in Philippines, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and U-Tapao in Thailand, was formulating a triangular strategy to rebalance US Naval power in the region. Suthichai also questioned Gen. Dempsey over NASA's impending request to use U-Tapao as its base to conduct its SEAC4RS atmospheric studies, which, according to the agency's website, were to take place in August and September. Though General. Dempsey appeared to have fully explained to Suthichai that NASA's project and the Pentagon's plan for U-Tapao were unrelated, the Thai mass media was concerned that, as a part of the US' pivot to Asia policy, the Pentagon planed to establish new US military installations and re-open former bases from the Cold War era. Further, during the one-hour long episode, Luang Lub host Jomquan Laopett discussed the “security concerns” with former Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, Foreign Ministry spokesman Thani Thongphakdi, and opposition Democrat deputy leader Thaworn Saennium. The host also spoke with Defense Minister Air Chief Marshall Sukampol Suwannathat about the lack of transparency of the planned use of U-Tapao by both US military and NASA. The circuitous interview with ACM Sukumpol and his seemingly evasive manner aroused further suspicion in Jomquan, who repeatedly suggested that U-Tapao would revert to a US base, that the presence of US military forces at U-Tapao could cause tension with neighboring countries, and that NASA's atmospheric studies may be used as a cover for the US military.

News of the U-Tapao plans also generated heated discussion on social media websites. For example, a blog post entitled, “How will the US' plan to establish a base at U-Tapao benefit or impact Thailand,” attracted a number of skeptics (and included Nick Ut's famous Associated Press "napalm" photo from the Vietnam War). Posters 14–16 warned that the presence of US troops could threaten relations with China, and turn the area into a terrorist target. Another commentator (8) on the same thread suggested that the US was trying to regain its footing in the region after slowly drifting away over the past decade. In a separate blog post, comment number 14 reminded readers that the US was not well-liked and warned that "Thailand should not do anything to upset China and Myanmar."

ASSESSMENT:

The bilateral relationship has drifted over the past decade, and the Thai public perception of the US has deteriorated due to mounting trade tensions over intellectual property rights, the failed negotiation of a bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA), and diverging strategic interests. Thailand has also felt snubbed by Washington, holding the view that the US "abandoned” Southeast Asia while conducting the Global War on Terror in the Middle East and resenting how US regional foreign policy has often focused on the Korean Peninsula. Even though U-Tapao has been a de facto hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations over the last several years (including after the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2008 Nargis cyclone in Myanmar, and the 2011 flood in Thailand), many Thais associate U-Tapao with its use by American warplanes flying into combat in Iraq. Thais also remember the base's use during the Vietnam war, and blame the US presence there for the development of some problems near the airbase.

As such, there is a growing distrust among Thais about Washington's “pivot” to Asia policy and US interest in U-Tapao. As shown by the Luang Lub show and Pantip blog posts outlined above, some Thai readers believe the HADR and NASA activities are merely being used by the US as cover for US counterbalancing of China's rising regional military power. Some even revealed that they were conducting research into US defense funding for space programs and the relationship between the US Pentagon and NASA. Many Thais are convinced and worried that U-Tapao will be used for surveillance and military operations against China, the region's rising superpower, and one of Thailand's closest trade and investment partners.

Japanese debate security cooperation with US to counter China

Thursday, May 3, 2012

BLUF:

A pair of new initiatives laid out in last week’s US-Japan 2+2 joint statement--in particular, the potential stationing of combined Japanese and US troops on US bases in the western Pacific--has become the focus of a major debate in Japan about whether the Noda administration has gone too far in siding with the US against China.

OBSERVED:

On Monday (30 April), Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda became the first DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) prime minister to make an official visit to Washington, DC. His visit came just days after the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (SCC), comprised of the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers, issued a major joint statement. The morning after Noda’s visit, Japan’s preeminent liberal newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, came out swinging.

The target of Asahi's ire was two new initiatives laid out in the joint SCC statement: the potential semi-permanent combined stationing of members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) together with US forces in shared-use facilities in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands for the purpose of conducting combined exercises, and the “strategic” use of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to provide key items like patrol boats to the Philippines and other coastal states in the region. Although the joint statement never mentioned China, Asahi had no doubt about the target of these new initiatives. “This kind of Japan-US cooperation no doubt conforms to US strategy towards China,” it argued. “But what about Japan? What advantage is there for Japan to participate in exercises aimed at deterrence in the waters near Guam?”

The widely read daily was equally critical of the new idea of “strategic” ODA. “Doesn’t the provision of patrol boats betray the fundamental ODA principle of avoiding military objectives? When they were provided to Indonesia in 2006, it was in the name of countering piracy in the Strait of Malacca. What’s the objective this time?”
Asahi’s critique was echoed by other liberal Japanese outlets, like the Chunichi Shimbun, which warned that stationing SDF forces in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands could backfire and result in increased regional military tensions. Chunichi also raised constitutional concerns: "Wouldn't exercises based on long-term overseas stationing of SDF members make them [constitutionally forbidden] 'overseas troops'?"

On the other side of the debate, conservative newspapers welcomed the proposed initiatives, with the Yomiuri Shimbun calling them “highly significant for deepening defense cooperation,” and the far-right Sankei Shimbun crowing that “these join t exercise locations will be nearly permanent, indicating a move in the direction of joint Japanese-US defense of the Asia-Pacific.”

ASSESSMENT:

When the DPJ swept to power in 2009 after more than 50 years of nearly unbroken conservative LDP rule, many observers in the US worried that Japan might start shifting closer toward China and away from the US. These concerns grew as DPJ heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa promptly led a group of over 140 DPJ Diet members on a trip to Beijing, while Prime Minister Hatoyama floated the idea of an East Asian Community without the US and pushed hard for the US to agree to change the joint plan to relocate the Futenma Marine base within Okinawa.

Three years later, Japan is already on its third DPJ prime minister, and it is firmly back in the US orbit. Japan has gone through six prime ministers in six years and shows no signs of slowing down, so a stable, long-term Japanese defense policy can only be based on strong public support and understanding. A robust debate within Japan over national defense should therefore be a welcome development to all outside observers.

This new debate over overseas stationing and strategic ODA initiatives goes to the heart of the security dilemma facing Japan: How should Japan adapt to the rise of China and the changing security situation in East Asia? As the US pivots toward Asia, should Japan double down and expand the regional scope of its defense cooperation with the US, even at the risk of provoking China, or should it try to strike a balance between the two great powers? The Noda administration has clearly decided on its response: it is intent on implementing a more broad-based defense cooperation with the US. The fact that this nominally left-wing DPJ administration is now being supported by Yomiuri and Sankei and harshly criticized by Asahi is a testament to the party’s evolution over the three years that it has been in power.

Watch for our upcoming Exovera special report on this new debate and how it reflects Japan's changing security security environment.

Panetta Visit to Kyrgyzstan: Manas Access Up in the Air Again?

Friday, March 23, 2012

BLUF:

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's 13 March visit to Bishtek caused fresh media speculation about the future of US access to the Manas transit center. While Kyrgyz state press reiterated the official position that any US military presence in the country would expire along with the current lease in July 2014, independent outlets saw the door open for new negotiations.

OBSERVED:

All major regional outlets in Central Asia reported on US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s visit to Bishkek. In a relatively brief report, Kyrgyz state-run Kabar highlighted, in a positive way, Panetta's meeting with Kyrgyzstan’s Secretary of Defense Council Busurmankul Tabaldiev and Defense Minister Taalaibek Omuraliev. Panetta thanked Kyrgyzstan for its support, and although he stressed the importance of the Transit Center at Manas to current and future operations in Afghanistan, he said he had not come to negotiate. Although Kabar did refer to closed door discussions on mutual military cooperation, it emphasized Busurmankul Tabaldiev’s statement that although Kyrgyzstan would be willing to allow the US continued use of Manas after the current lease expired in July 2012, it would limit such use to civilian commercial transportation and that "there should be no military mission and military personnel." New Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev reiterated the message that Kyrgyzstan wanted no US military presence at the base after July 2014. As usual, the state press offered virtually no commentary or analysis on the visit.

Independent press outlets, however, focused on possible steps that the Pentagon might take to secure continued use of Manas. The independent Azyttyk revealed that Secretary of Defense Council Tabaldiev told it that US-Kyrgyzstan negotiations on Manas would begin in April when a group of US experts arrived in Kyrgyzstan to conduct talks. Gezitter, another independent outlet, speculated that Washington most likely would not take President Atambayev's statements on Manas as his final position, and that it probably expected to find a loophole to extend the lease agreement. The outlet even suggested that the US would be able to identify a way to change President Atambayev's mind just like it had done with ousted former President Kurmanbek Bakiev in 2009.

ASSESSMENT:

The Transit Center in Manas has garnered media attention inside and outside Kyrgyzstan in recent years due to controversy over the US lease agreement, scandals related to fuel contracts, and Kremlin dissatisfaction with having the US military presence in its back yard. The recent Panetta visit triggered a new wave of speculation in regional media, with independent outlets drawing parallels between the current situation and 2009, when Bishkek reversed course and granted an extension of the US lease despite heavy pressure from Russia. Former President Bakiev allowed the US to stay after the US agreed to triple its rent payment to $60 million a year, triggering anger from Russia.

The US is expected to do what it can to retain access to the logistical hub that is crucial for US and NATO operations in Afghanistan, especially ahead of the logistical draw down from Afghanistan scheduled for the end of 2014. Although the government press hewed close to the party line on no extension of the US lease, regional analysts appear to believe that a new agreement could be negotiated, albeit at a new hefty price for Washington, in either rent or concessions. Although supporting an orderly NATO exit in Afghanistan may serve Kyrgyzstan's interest with regard to regional stability, an extended US presence in Manas could also make Kyrgyzstan susceptible to strikes from militant groups. Furthermore, the shadow of possible conflict with Iran hangs over the region, and local tolerance for a third US war in the region will be nearly nonexistent. Finally, with the US and NATO exit from Afghanistan, the Kyrgyzstan government will be keen to maintain good relations with Russia, the country’s major investor and regional partner.

Mexican Media Hints at Rift between Calderon and USNORTHCOM

Mexico | United States of America | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy

Friday, March 23, 2012

BLUF:

“Interventionist statements” at the US Senate from USNORTHCOM Commander General Charles Jacoby triggered a harsh reaction from the Mexican media. They suggested his views about an “acceptable” level of civilian deaths were colored by his service in Afghanistan and Iraq and hinted and bristled at his “hard criticisms” of the Calderon Administration's strategy against organized crime.

OBSERVED:

Extensive coverage throughout Mexican media highlighted Commander of US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) General Charles Jacoby's 13 March US Senate Armed Services Committee testimony on NORTHCOM's FY-13 budget. While wire articles from agencies such as Notimex and AFP featured headlines such as “Northern Command supports military strategy in Mexico,” Mexican outlets themselves focused instead on Jacoby’s comments about the “unacceptable” level of deaths and doubts about whether Mexico’s current strategy was having a “palpable effect” on organized crime in the country. Echoing a widespread focus on Jacoby’s statement that it was “premature to judge whether [Mexico is] winning or losing” the fight, left-leaning La Jornada in particular criticized the US for overstepping its bounds by commenting on internal Mexican policies. A 14 March editorial from the outlet attacked the US for ignoring a growing “international public opinion” towards a less militaristic approach while “in our country a daily bloodbath continues to unfold.” This sentiment was also evident in the attached 15 March cartoon depicting Mexico asking the US “after how many more deaths will we be able to say that we are winning the war?”

Tamaulipas’ El Mañana, which practices some self-censorship on narco-trafficking issues due to attacks on its offices and journalists, was also highly critical of Jacoby’s “interventionist statement on Mexico’s strategy” and accused the US of having intentions to “militarize” the US-Mexico Free Trade Agreement. Noting that Jacoby “ascended to the leadership of the Northern Command after his role in Iraq and Afghanistan,” the outlet suggested that to determine the number of deaths “acceptable” to the US, Mexico need look no farther than the “450,000 innocent people murdered” during the “US occupation” in those countries. Similar coverage from El Financiero warned that one of the “hidden points” of the US agenda was to pressure Mexico into a “military treaty” as an extension of the trade agreement, allowing the “direct participation” in Mexico of US forces and the “application of methods of stabilization” like those “developed by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Noting that these “hard criticisms” from Jacoby “were received with annoyance by the administration of President Felipe Calderon,” a brief political gossip column from El Universal subsequently speculated whether “the general had a warm welcome” during his “discrete work visit” to Mexico on 15-16 March.

ASSESSMENT:

Reactions to the 13 March testimony suggest a mounting media suspicion of US intentions to manipulate the drug war to “pressure” Mexico into broader political acquiescence, hinting also at potential conflicts between the Obama and Calderon administrations that could spill over into upcoming election debates in both countries. Although Jacoby’s comments on the “unacceptable” number of deaths is in line with long-running Mexican concerns about the issue, the media appears to view his stance as hypocritical given the perceived unwillingness by the US to abandon the militaristic approach widely blamed by Mexicans for the problem. Rather than welcoming increased US attention in the fight against organized crime, Jacoby’s testimony on the “valiant” if not yet “palpable” efforts taken by the Mexican government were seen as “meddling” in internal policies, while his concern for the level of violence was seen in some outlets as a pretext for eventual US intervention.

The increased focus on Jacoby’s background in Iraq and Afghanistan is also troubling, as it could fuel comparisons between controversial and highly unpopular US actions and well publicized human rights abuses in those countries with its policies in Mexico. Outlets have already noted that the new US military attaché in Mexico, Admiral Collin Kilrain, has a similar background supporting US operations in Afghanistan. As suggested in the attached cartoon from El Economista, any US connections to future controversial counternarcotics efforts in Mexico are likely to be judged within this framework.

MUTED COVERAGE OF U.S. RADAR BASE

Friday, March 9, 2012

BLUF:

Turkish media commentators have been unusually passive regarding the installation and manning of the new U.S. radar station in Kürecik, Malatya province, a major component of NATO's missile defense system. Curiously light media coverage belies the regional and international strategic importance of what would normally be a controversial issue in Turkey and may be a sign of media self-censorship.

OBSERVED:

In September 2011, Turkey and the US signed an agreement to install an X-Band early warning radar facility at Kürecik, in the eastern province of Malatya. In late February, it was disclosed publicly that US soldiers had begun to arrive at the radar base, a key component of NATO's missile defense system. Despite brief reports on these developments and some light coverage of local activist protests near the base, Turkish outlets chose not to examine the issue and the story went almost unnoticed by most Turks.

One of the few commentaries to consider in any depth the implications of Turkey's decision to host the radar facility was by Fehim Taştekin, published 29 December 2011 in the liberal newspaper Radikal. In his article, "Radar, the messenger of a war," Taştekin noted the lack of reaction to the decision despite the deployment being part of a “possible war” against Iran, a country with which Turkey had historically maintained peaceful relations. Although the government refused to publicly acknowledge that the radar was built to defend NATO countries--and controversially for many Turks, possibly Israel--from missiles from Iran, Taştekin warned that Turkey risked hostile relations with its neighbors. To Taştekin, tension with Iran, and Turkey's side-taking in both Syria and in the Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq were all signs of a “sad autumn” with regard to Middle East and Turkey relations.

Taştekin acknowledged political benefits for the Turkish government, such as improved relations with the U.S., and reduced pressure regarding damaged Turkey-Israel relations. However, he ultimately argued that Turkey was being taken for "a ride." He points to Russia and its preparations around the Black Sea region in response to threats of an Israeli attack on Iran and raises the argument that Azerbaijan might take advantage of any war to try to take back Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, creating another hot conflict (with likely Russian involvement) near Turkey’s border. The article also notes U.S. “unwillingness” to take up Russia's offer of use of Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan and concludes that the U.S. was exaggerating Iran's threat to NATO nations.

ASSESSMENT:

As the author of the article cited above acknowledges, the Turkish government decision to host the Kürecik radar station helps ease the recent strain in Turkey's relations with Europe, Israel, and the U.S. It is widely discussed in Turkey that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been losing popularity and prestige in Europe and in the rest of the west. Therefore, it seems like a logical and strategically sound decision for Erdoğan to allow a radar base in Turkey in order to improve his standing, and given his adamant reaction to U.S.-led efforts against Iran's nuclear program in the United Nations, could help restore his reputation as a partner in the eye of U.S. government. Considering the 2003 refusal to allow U.S. soldiers in İncirlik, the opening of the radar base might be considered one of the most important strategic US-Turkey developments in a decade.

Until recently, Erdoğan had been seen as a visionary leader by many in the Middle East. He had garnered praise for close relations with governments around the region, including Israel and Syria, and volunteered to mediate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Erdoğan has seen old friends become his new enemies. First, Turkey's close relation with Israel disintegrated, then relations with Syria soured, and now, relations with Iran are strained due in part to the radar base. These developments could complicate Erdoğan's ambition to make Turkey a "regional power" because Turkey will now be seen as taking sides.

Given widespread and historical popular distrust of the U.S., Fehim Taştekin's article cited above demonstrates how controversial, or at least consequential, the Kürecik radar base could be in the eyes of many Turks (rightly or wrongly). Aside from his piece, however, media reaction has been muted and debate just about non-existent. While small local media outlets have covered ongoing protests by locals and marginal anti-nuclear groups, the mainstream media has apparently decided not to pick up these stories. It is especially striking when contrasted to the extensive coverage and visceral public opposition to deploying U.S. soldiers and a second U.S. base in Turkey ahead of the Iraq war (not to mention the typically anti-Israeli sentiment prevalent in much of Turkish society).

The dearth of debate could be explained in part by coverage being overshadowed by other major stories: The original U.S.-Turkey agreement coincided with the Van earthquake and the deployment of U.S. soldiers may have been overtaken by coverage of the conflict in Syria. Still, since September, commentary on the subject has been extraordinarily rare.

Given widespread evidence of increasingly heavy handed media intervention by the government, another explanation could be media self censorship. As the government silences its opponents in the media, including detention of outspoken critics, most outlets have begun to apply heavy self censorship, and have clearly been less enthusiastic about opposing or criticizing the government on important controversial issues.

Leftist Media on Alert against USSOCOM’s “License to Kill” in Latin America

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

BLUF:

A report from the BBC that “the unit that killed Bin Laden” may extend operations to Latin America quickly prompted state media reports of U.S. “plans to sabotage” leftist governments. Despite the story’s current low profile, past observation of events suggest leaders such as Chavez will be quick to revive it when politically convenient.

OBSERVED:

Following the request by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for “greater flexibility” in deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to regions including Latin America, a 16 February BBC article on the issue triggered significant attention in the left-leaning press in Latin America. In particular, state-controlled outlets in countries such as Cuba and Venezuela highlighted quotes in the article from Adam Isaacson of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), who suggested the U.S. could pursue “acts of sabotage” in countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador or Nicaragua. Isaacson also characterized the previous establishment of “Military Liaison Elements” in local embassies as a forerunner of the proposed USSOCOM expansion.

While the majority of wire coverage maintained the original title referring to the “forces that killed Bin Laden,” the BBC article subsequently appeared in several state-run and leftist sources around the region under the headline “U.S. Special Forces plan to conduct 'sabotage in Latin America,' affirms the BBC.” Similar headlines appeared in outlets such as Argentina’s Mirada al Sur, in which journalist Walter Goobar (who had previously expressed doubts about the death of Bin Laden) claimed “the policy of selective assassinations inaugurated with Bin Laden’s death has become the axis of the doctrine of asymmetric warfare waged by Obama.” Mirada and multiple other outlets also noted coverage from the Spanish-language version of state-controlled Russia Today, which featured an interview with Mexican Professor Victor Manuel Quintana, who speculated that the “hidden mission of these squads may be the intimidation of governments antagonistic towards Washington.”

In Colombia, where suspicions still run high after the recent controversy with the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and past issues such as the Melgar and Juanchaco incidents, Semana magazine featured a forum for readers to voice their opinions. Published selections included common and expected sentiments against “bringing more war to the continent” and the characteristic “Yankees go home!” Reader comments on the original story also focused on the previous controversies involving U.S. military forces in Colombia. However, others published by Semana noted that a heightened U.S. presence would be a “double-edged sword,” acknowledging the potential benefits of a “specialized group” that “advised” the Colombian military but did not “participate in armed conflict.”

ASSESSMENT:

Although the relatively low profile to date may suggest the story went largely unnoticed, past behavior in the region strongly indicates that it will be revived by primary actors such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Following the 2 July 2009 revelation in Colombia by Cambio magazine of the negotiations of the DCA, there was a full two-week lag before Bolivian President Evo Morales called Colombia a “regional traitor” and Chavez put relations with Colombia “under review.” It is no coincidence that the bogus “sabotage” storyline attracted state media attention in countries such as Cuba and Russia, who have regularly accused the U.S. of “fomenting domestic instability.” With Chavez facing electoral uncertainty and an unexpectedly motivated challenge by the opposition at home, he is almost certain to make such connections in the future. Already, his campaign has responded to a violent incident involving the opposition campaign and pro-Chavez supporters by accusing the “desperate right” of “promoting destabilization” as a campaign “tactic.”

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