Proliferation

MUTED COVERAGE OF U.S. RADAR BASE

Iran | United States of America | Turkey | Regional Relations and Stability | Political Stability and Governance | Proliferation | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | Strategic Theatre Missile Programs
Friday, March 9, 2012
Islami Davet (13 Sept. 2011)
BLUF: 
Turkish media commentators have been unusually passive regarding the installation and manning of the new U.S. radar station in Kürecik, Malatya province, a major component of NATO's missile defense system. Curiously light media coverage belies the regional and international strategic importance of what would normally be a controversial issue in Turkey and may be a sign of media self-censorship.
OBSERVED: 
In September 2011, Turkey and the US signed an agreement to install an X-Band early warning radar facility at Kürecik, in the eastern province of Malatya. In late February, it was disclosed publicly that US soldiers had begun to arrive at the radar base, a key component of NATO's missile defense system. Despite brief reports on these developments and some light coverage of local activist protests near the base, Turkish outlets chose not to examine the issue and the story went almost unnoticed by most Turks.

One of the few commentaries to consider in any depth the implications of Turkey's decision to host the radar facility was by Fehim Taştekin, published 29 December 2011 in the liberal newspaper Radikal. In his article, "Radar, the messenger of a war," Taştekin noted the lack of reaction to the decision despite the deployment being part of a “possible war” against Iran, a country with which Turkey had historically maintained peaceful relations. Although the government refused to publicly acknowledge that the radar was built to defend NATO countries--and controversially for many Turks, possibly Israel--from missiles from Iran, Taştekin warned that Turkey risked hostile relations with its neighbors. To Taştekin, tension with Iran, and Turkey's side-taking in both Syria and in the Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq were all signs of a “sad autumn” with regard to Middle East and Turkey relations.

Taştekin acknowledged political benefits for the Turkish government, such as improved relations with the U.S., and reduced pressure regarding damaged Turkey-Israel relations. However, he ultimately argued that Turkey was being taken for "a ride." He points to Russia and its preparations around the Black Sea region in response to threats of an Israeli attack on Iran and raises the argument that Azerbaijan might take advantage of any war to try to take back Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, creating another hot conflict (with likely Russian involvement) near Turkey’s border. The article also notes U.S. “unwillingness” to take up Russia's offer of use of Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan and concludes that the U.S. was exaggerating Iran's threat to NATO nations.

ASSESSMENT: 
As the author of the article cited above acknowledges, the Turkish government decision to host the Kürecik radar station helps ease the recent strain in Turkey's relations with Europe, Israel, and the U.S. It is widely discussed in Turkey that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been losing popularity and prestige in Europe and in the rest of the west. Therefore, it seems like a logical and strategically sound decision for Erdoğan to allow a radar base in Turkey in order to improve his standing, and given his adamant reaction to U.S.-led efforts against Iran's nuclear program in the United Nations, could help restore his reputation as a partner in the eye of U.S. government. Considering the 2003 refusal to allow U.S. soldiers in İncirlik, the opening of the radar base might be considered one of the most important strategic US-Turkey developments in a decade.
Until recently, Erdoğan had been seen as a visionary leader by many in the Middle East. He had garnered praise for close relations with governments around the region, including Israel and Syria, and volunteered to mediate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Erdoğan has seen old friends become his new enemies. First, Turkey's close relation with Israel disintegrated, then relations with Syria soured, and now, relations with Iran are strained due in part to the radar base. These developments could complicate Erdoğan's ambition to make Turkey a "regional power" because Turkey will now be seen as taking sides.
Given widespread and historical popular distrust of the U.S., Fehim Taştekin's article cited above demonstrates how controversial, or at least consequential, the Kürecik radar base could be in the eyes of many Turks (rightly or wrongly). Aside from his piece, however, media reaction has been muted and debate just about non-existent. While small local media outlets have covered ongoing protests by locals and marginal anti-nuclear groups, the mainstream media has apparently decided not to pick up these stories. It is especially striking when contrasted to the extensive coverage and visceral public opposition to deploying U.S. soldiers and a second U.S. base in Turkey ahead of the Iraq war (not to mention the typically anti-Israeli sentiment prevalent in much of Turkish society). 

The dearth of debate could be explained in part by coverage being overshadowed by other major stories: The original U.S.-Turkey agreement coincided with the Van earthquake and the deployment of U.S. soldiers may have been overtaken by coverage of the conflict in Syria. Still, since September, commentary on the subject has been extraordinarily rare.

Given widespread evidence of increasingly heavy handed media intervention by the government, another explanation could be media self censorship. As the government silences its opponents in the media, including detention of outspoken critics, most outlets have begun to apply heavy self censorship, and have clearly been less enthusiastic about opposing or criticizing the government on important controversial issues.

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Lack of Opposition Challenge Leaves Infighting The Regime's Greatest Challenge

Iran | Political Stability and Governance | Regional Relations and Stability | Terrorism | Proliferation
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
BLUF: 
As the Iranian regime celebrated the anniversary of the 1979 revolution, the opposition called for a mass rally. The opposition's unwillingness to challenge Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei directly, however, leaves infighting between governing factions the regime's most pressing domestic challenge.
OBSERVED: 
On 11 February, the Islamist regime in Tehran celebrated its 33rd anniversary. Leading up to that date, pro-regime media outlets hailed the occasion as a major milestone and went into overdrive urging droves to come out in support of the regime. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei himself called it an important symbolic gesture in the face of international pressures against the country. Predictably, the pro-regime outlets linked the anniversary to Iran’s latest standoff with the West. A multitude of articles painted a positive picture of Tehran’s regional and global standing, while dismissing the impact of sanctions on the country. As one example, the editor of the hard line newspaper Kayhan referred to the political changes in the Arab world as Western “strategic losses in the region [Middle East]” that worked in Iran’s favor.

Meanwhile, opposition outlets did take the opportunity to lambaste the regime for staying in power by repressing dissent. The Green opposition movement’s outlet Rah-e Sabz highlighted the unprecedented pressure on the families of opposition leaders from security forces. The outlet said that the daughters of Mir Hussain Mousavi, one of the two leaders of the Green movement, were threatened with arrest and one was barred from attending classes at Al Zahra University where she was enrolled. It pointed out that regime’s agents had repeatedly threatened their lives and that the threats had escalated after a recent joint public letter by the families of Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi about their parents who had been under house arrest since February 2011. Elsewhere, the leadership committee of the Green movement, Coordination Council of the Path of Hope [Shuray-e Hamahangiy-e Rah-e Sabz Omid], issued a statement through opposition-affiliated press in which it called for the release of 39 political prisoners. It also called for a peaceful anti-regime demonstration on 14 February. In its statement, the council said the rally would be aimed against both the “the coup d’etat government” (a reference to the fraudulent 2009 elections in which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad retained the presidency despite mass protests) and against any foreign intervention in Iran, the latter reflecting the Green opposition’s desire to maintain its nationalist credentials.

Aside from the customary annual praise for the Islamic Republic at the time of the 1979 anniversary, Iranian media were overflowing with speculation about the outcome of the 2 March parliamentary elections. Again, it is Ayatollah Khamenei who had been urging a major turnout at these elections as a signal to the West about the legitimacy of the regime. As the reformists have boycotted the elections – they believe the pre-screening and disqualification of reformist candidates and other shortcomings make the process a farce – the contest is between two factions: those aligned to President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei, respectively.

ASSESSMENT: 
It was clear in the weeks preceding the 1979 anniversary that the regime was strongly intent on using the occasion as a show of popular support. Despite its efforts, the pro-regime rallies were pedestrian and like previous years': plenty of coverage by state-controlled broadcasters and dramatization of an exaggerated turnout. Meanwhile, the opposition leadership’s call through its press for peaceful protests was at best a timid move, highly unlikely to electrify the large grassroots support that the Green movement continues to enjoy in the country. Green movement leadership still fails to directly challenge the key obstacle to reform in Iran--Ayatollah Khamenei and his supporters who dominate the key political and security organs in the regime. The failure to challenge Khamenei directly reflects both the opposition's fear of reprisal and its lack of a plan to confront the status quo. With the Green movement sidelined and unable to galvanize its supporters, the two factions centered around Khamenei and Ahmadinejad will be pitted against each other for control as the country moves toward the 2 March parliamentary elections.
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