Strategic Theatre Missile Programs

Russia Flexes Its Nuclear Muscles

Russia | Strategic Theatre Missile Programs
Thursday, October 25, 2012
Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (22 Oct 2012)
BLUF: 
Last week, Russia successfully conducted the most comprehensive tests of all three components of its nuclear “triad” since 1991. Media coverage addressed the connection between the exercises and Moscow’s opposition to a European BMD system, sending the signal that Russia could develop its own arsenal if the West refuses to cooperate on the basis of mutual respect.
OBSERVED: 
Late last week, Russia conducted the most comprehensive tests of all three components of its nuclear “triad” since 1991. A Topol RS-12M (SS-25 Sickle) ICBM launched from the Plesetsk cosmodrome hit a target in Kamchatka, while another fired from nuclear submarine Svyatoi Georgii Pobedonosets in the Sea of Okhotsk reached its target at the Chizha testing range in northwestern Arkhangelsk oblast. Long-range Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers fired winged missiles at targets at the Pemba testing range in the Komi region; this aspect of the exercises included the first test of the new “Pantsir-C” zenith anti-aircraft weapon system, according to Rossiisskaya Gazeta (RG).

Most of the media coverage of the tests remained limited to brief, straightforward reporting that emphasized their “unprecedented” nature, rarely going into a deeper analysis of their domestic and/or international significance. However, media outlets highlighted the success of the exercises, which “accomplished all their tasks” and “confirmed the reliability and effectiveness of Russia’s nuclear triad.” One author noted that one of the missiles fired in Kamchatka was 24 years old, just like hundreds of others: “The lack of problems with its preparation, launch, and hitting the target confirmed the high combat quality of the missiles and the possibility of extending” their period of safe use by several years.

Some outlets stressed the connection between the tests and US plans to locate BMD installations “in close proximity” to Russia, something that has long worried the country’s political and military leadership. Moskovskii Komsomolets (MK) author Ignat Kalinin said “everything was done so that ... there will remain no doubt that Russia will respond with actions, and not words, if the US global system of anti-missile defense continues to develop.” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (NVO) wrote that, along with the strategic missile launches, Russia’s decision to revive a Soviet-era railway-missile complex and develop a new heavy liquid fuel missile comes as a response and a warning “to our friends from overseas.”

Despite the achievements in military development, which were highly praised in the pro-state media, the tests came at a time when the poor condition of the Russian military and its technical potential are widely criticized. General Gleb Tsherbatov told the Agency of Russian Information that Russian authorities “learned from the masters of Hollywood propaganda” to show “old rusty junk,” while calling it a “nuclear triad” and “throw dust in the eyes of stupid Russian housewives.” The article also explored in detail the moribund state of the Russian military arsenal. On the website for the Russian Communist Party, Duma Defense Committee President Vladimir Komoedov stressed the need to modernize the country’s strategic arsenal, emphasizing its weaknesses compared to that of the U.S.

Public opinion revealed some skepticism about the “large-scale” tests. Reader Solomon commented on the news, emphasizing that President Vladimir Putin’s personal involvement in the exercises could have been an attempt to “boost” fallen ratings. He further warned that Putin should be “careful” with the red “button,” suggesting that the leader’s recent PR-moves have backfired. MK reader Ross saw another arms race coming at the expense of social programs: “We’ve already done all of that, have you forgotten? Guns instead of butter. ... Again they want to ransack the budget, while they raise the retirement age. Degenerates.” Another opinion on social media forum LiveJournal looked at the tests in the context of ongoing events in the Middle East, possibly suggesting that they were intended to scare off Turkey’s supporters (i.e., the U.S., since Russia and the U.S. are the only countries possessing strategic nuclear forces), in order to leave Ankara to face Iran, Iraq, and Syria alone for the “neighbor talks.” 

ASSESSMENT: 
The “nuclear triad” tests come at a time when Russia sees increasing NATO activity near its borders, including frequent military exercises that perceives as “unnecessary.” In addition, negotiations on the BMD system in Europe remain deadlocked, which Russia blames on American unwillingness to agree to the Kremlin’s demands to limit the building of BMD installations. Russia believes that the establishment of such objects close to its borders would necessarily affect the deterrent capacity of its strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, Moscow seeks to make it clear that the missile shield issue remains an obstacle in U.S.-Russia relations and requires further discussion. Top Russian officials have warned on several occasions, should political and diplomatic solutions fail, Russia would be “forced” to resort to a technical response to BMD by developing and upgrading its own capabilities, something the U.S. and NATO “would not like,” according to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. For instance, Russia recently announced a plan to develop its own naval BMD, similar to the U.S. Aegis combat system. In the meantime, the Kremlin questioned cooperation with the U.S. in other related areas, mainly by refusing to extend the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that has been in place since the 1990s. Although Russia believes it could control and destroy outdated strategic rockets and biological and chemical weapons independently, the Kremlin says it would sign a new agreement based on the principles of mutual respect and equal rights. 
Preserving its nuclear-power status is especially important to Russia in light of the economic crisis, the uncertainty of U.S. post-election policy toward Russia, the turmoil in the Middle East and near Russian borders as well as Russia’s diminished military and technical capacity. The government's mouthpiece, RG vaunted other recent tests of military technology, involving Mi-35M helicopters at the Korenovsk base in Krasnodar and the “Severodvinsk” Yasen class nuclear attack submarine. The daily also announced Russia's plans to conduct the first test of the BrahMos submarine missile at the end of the year. Furthermore, Duma Defense Committee head Vladimir Komoedov said Moscow plans to spend over 100bn rubles on nuclear weapons in 2013-2015. However, it is not clear that Russian financial resources will be able to meet the Kremlin’s ambitious plans while keeping social programs in place. Cuts in social spending could easily contribute to growing public anger. In the meantime, Russian political and military decision makers must be aware of the possibility of budget sequestration in the US, and the drastic defense budget cuts that would bring, but no mention of this was found in monitored outlets. 
It is not quite clear whether the tests were just a warning that Russia is losing patience with being left out of political decision-making on critical issues, or whether the Kremlin has already set out on the path of upgrading its military and nuclear arsenal. Russian authorities justify such a move by exaggerating the existing “foreign threat,” as they seek to remind the international community of Russia’s nuclear-power status. The Kremlin is probably signaling that both options are on the table: cooperation with the West on the basis of mutual respect and true partnership vs. independent development of Russia’s own military power to counter perceived threats. At the domestic level, the emphasis on the success of the tests, the capabilities of Russia’s strategic arsenal, and plans for new technological development could be seen as propaganda aimed at evoking national pride and distracting people from the political opposition and its criticisms. If this were the case, however, one would expect to have found more coverage of the tests in the mass media.
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Mixed Reaction to Moscow Missile Defense Conference

Strategic Theatre Missile Programs | Russia | United States
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
Moskovsky Komsomolets (4 May 2012)
BLUF: 
The 3-4 May Moscow Missile Defense Conference drew mixed reactions from the Russian press. Although Russia's warning that it might launch a pre-emptive strike against the EuroBMD system if NATO did not heed its concerns was the most newsworthy development, some outlets also communicated, along with a sense that there was still time to reach agreement with NATO, suggestions for cooperation.
OBSERVED: 
The 3-4 May Moscow Missile Defense Conference, organized by the Russia's Ministry of Defense and attended by representatives from 50 countries including the US and other NATO states, drew both positive and negative reactions from the Russian press. The most newsworthy development was Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov’s announcement that Russia could launch a preemptive strike against the European Ballistic Missile Defense (EuroBMD) system in the future in order to protect itself from the perceived threat. Izvestia quoted him saying that measures were being worked out to protect Russian missile bases and mobile installations, and also to increase the readiness of Russian weapons. Kommersant, on the other hand, gave voice to the view that EuroBMD was, for technical reasons, no threat to Russia. At the conference, the author interviewed MIT professor and ballistic missile expert Theodore Postol, who claimed that such a system “doesn’t work and never could work.” According to Kommersant, the Professor Postol said the project “simply doesn’t exist” and that some missile interceptor tests planned for the end of 2011 had not even begun.

In some cases the coverage conveyed a restrained optimism that the West and Russia would be able to resolve their differences. Izvestia relayed Antonov’s announcement that, in the event of an agreement, Russia’s Don-2N radio-locator station could be used to fight along with the US and NATO against a potential mutual medium- and long-range missile threats. When asked why there had been no breakthrough on the BMD issue during the meeting, the minister replied “this is an international conference, not negotiations.” According to Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, General Staff head Nikolay Makarov said that Russia and NATO could still resolve the conflict surrounding EuroBMD and that they “had not reached the point of no return.” According to Antonov in his interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta, the point of no return would be the third stage of BMD development planned for 2017, as that would require “Russia’s adequate reaction” and reciprocal steps. The daily Vzgliad also quoted Russian President Dmitry Medvedev as saying that all parties had about 5-7 years to resolve the issue before making “final decisions.”

In other cases, outlets were more pessimistic and criticized the US, NATO and Russia for their approach to the issue. In Kommersant, security analyst and former Moscow Bureau Editor of the BBC Russian Service Konstantin Eggert pointed out what he saw as the growing absurdity of the BMD back-and-forth and the “surreal” nature of Russia’s position. Even as Moscow suspected NATO of wanting to destroy Russia, he said, it still wanted "cooperat[ion] with NATO and America, as long as NATO and America guarantee us the possibility of destroying them.” Regarding the US side, Izvestia cited Konstantin Sivkov, First Vice President of the Academy for Geopolitical Problems, who said that legal and political agreements with the US would be worthless. Leaders come and go, he said, but military potential remained, which was why a technical guarantee was needed. Besides, he added, the actions of the Americans in Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere “show that they couldn’t care less about agreements.”

Some outlets noted the role that the US presidential election was expected to play in the future. Retired Lt. General Viktor Yesin told Izvestia that this election would decide everything. If President Obama was to stay, there was a chance that Washington would give a legal guarantee to Russia, he said. If Romney was to be elected, however, “talks will reach a dead end.” The general then acknowledged that the Obama administration’s “hands are tied” by a Congress that could forbid him from giving guarantees. Moskovsky Komsomolets also attributed the stubbornness of the US and NATO in maintaining their position, without consideration for Russia's perspective, to US domestic politics. It was also connected with the “astronomical profits” US arms manufacturers stood to make from BMD system development, said the author.

ASSESSMENT: 
Russia has long complained about feeling excluded from the ongoing decision-making process on BMD in Europe, and about its demands for equal partnership status being ignored. Past consultations have been conducted “behind the closed doors” and have not led to mutual understanding on the issue. Events such as the defense conference allow Russia to voice its opinion and concerns but also serve to justify further development of its military potential. In addition, the conference provided Russia with an opportunity to prove the credibility of its intentions in the eyes of the international community and “eliminate possible doubts of Western politicians and experts” with respect to its existing capabilities. Therefore, the message conveyed in the media was that, should the West pass on the opportunity to recognize the importance and potential of cooperating with Russia, the same tools could be quickly employed as elements of deterrence.
According to the Russian media, low expectations about reaching an understanding (and about the conference in general) stem from a number of factors, including the lower than expected rankings of attending representatives. Other persistent issues include the lack of an effective cooperation framework, US hesitance to provide desired guarantees that the anti-missile shield does not single out Russia, and differences in defining threats as potential targets for BMD. Negative attitudes reflected in the media mainly revolve around the perception that BMD could upset Russia's nuclear potential, trigger feelings of insecurity, and therefore destabilize the global balance of power. In order to restore the balance, Russia might respond with further development of its nuclear potential. Some outlets conveyed Russia’s warnings of the dangerous consequences of such an imbalance (e.g., possible overreaction) and expressed concern that its future actions taken in the interests of national security could be misinterpreted as aggressiveness.
Although the media coverage reflected low expectations of any immediate breakthrough, the overall attitude regarding the prospects for US-Russia cooperation is not all “doom and gloom.” Opinions presented in the media remain split on the prospects of long-term US-Russia cooperation on BMD. More optimistic observations are based either on skepticism about why the US would have any intention to attack Russia, or on analysis of the limitations of current and potential technical capabilities on both sides. The former criticize outdated and irrelevant cold war phobias and call for new, more trustful relations. The latter offer a detailed technical evaluation of BMD ability to intercept Russian ICBMs. Reflecting this view, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie concluded that 2020 BMD technology would not undermine Russian strategic nuclear capabilities, and pointed out that no one even knows what the final BMD architecture will look like.
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US and GCC Relations

Bahrain | Iran | Kuwait | Oman | PAN-ARAB | Qatar | Saudi Arabia | UAE | United States | Regional Military Cooperation | Strategic Theatre Missile Programs
Wednesday, April 18, 2012
Al Riyadh (1 Apr. 2012)
BLUF: 
Many writers welcome a new multilateral “partnership” between US and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) counties, but widespread ambivalence, including questions about the US proposal for a regional missile defense system against Iran, is evident in regional press following the first GCC-US Strategic Cooperation Forum.
OBSERVED: 
The first ministerial meeting of the GCC-US Strategic Cooperation Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 31 March, generated extensive coverage in the Pan-Arab press. Most reporting in the region applauded the US' new multilateral approach toward the group and all highlighted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's emphasis on the US' "rock solid and unwavering" commitment to the six GCC allies--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, the Saudi director of International Economic Relations at the GCC, wrote that the new GCC-US Strategic Forum was an indication that the US recognized its need to address "nuclear weapons proliferation, spread of ballistic missiles, terrorism, and maritime risks in waters of the Gulf and Arabian Sea" collectively, and that it "represents a new beginning for a historical partnership." Kuwaiti Professor Dr. Abdullah Al Shayji wrote of a similar "strategic shift in US policy" in his article "The Gulf and US…From Allies to Partners," published in UAE's Al Ittihad.

Chief among the economic and security cooperation items discussed, Secretary Clinton's message about the US "priority to help the GCC build a regional missile defense architecture" against a looming ballistic missile threat from Iran took center stage. Outlets noted Iran's predictable rejection of what it called the "American-Zionist project." Advising Arab "friends" to avoid participating "in such a game," Iran's Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said the missile defense project would "undermine regional security." Similarly, the head of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, called the US plan to establish a missile shield "a source of tension."

Gulf officials, however, described the GCC-US forum outcomes as "positive and constructive." Responding to the Iranian criticism, for example, the Kuwaiti Al Anba newspaper reported that, "Kuwaiti diplomatic and military sources rejected Vahidi's warning and will not allow any party to interfere in its internal matters." The sources added, "Kuwait considers its security an integral part of the GCC countries' security and stability." The paper, however, quoted other diplomatic sources as saying, "The missile shield plan in the Gulf area remains only an idea that is under negotiations between the concerned parties aimed at promoting additional security for the Gulf States amid continued growing tensions and threats in the area."

More ambivalent, commenting on the forum, prominent Emirati businessman Khalaf Al Habtoor said, "I support our collaboration with the big powers, but we should not allow them to control our future." Entitled "Enough of leaving security to others," Habtoor's opinion piece in the UAE's Gulf News indicated that super powers "operate out of self-interest," and he wondered, "Haven't we learned any lessons from the US-led invasion of Iraq, which we were powerless to prevent? Besides being a humiliation, there is danger in relying on another country for our defense. What happens if and when we disagree in the future? We will either have to bow our heads--or be vulnerable to a protector-turned-foe." More pointedly, "America is [a country] We Loathe ... [but] We Need!!," wrote Deputy Editor-in-Chief Yousef Al Kowaileet of the Saudi Al Riyadh. While noting that the US was "the most influential force in the political, economic and technical arenas," Kowaileet cautioned Arabs that, "America is an enemy that must be dealt with cautiously while understanding its plans and aims."

ASSESSMENT: 
For decades, cooperation between the US and GCC governments has been strong, but dependent on a country-by-country approach. To the region, the GCC-US Strategic Cooperation Forum indicates a new US strategy, based on multilateral cooperation with the Gulf States rather than a bilateral one. The strategy, consistent with the multilateral approach in the region taken by the US to great effect during the Libya crisis, is clearly designed to mitigate the Iranian nuclear threat and to fortify the overall effort to isolate Iran and Syria.
Yet, such collective cooperation faces serious challenges. According to a lead Gulf News editorial, “the reality is that the GCC has not yet developed its institutions enough to act on its own. The GCC remains a grouping of six nations with shared aims, rather than an organized bloc.”

Despite Iran’s warning against implementing a missile defense shield in the region, several Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, have already purchased Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems from the US. Gulf countries, however, have limited defensive operational capabilities and lack a fully integrated and coordinated air missile defense shield. In addition, GCC states have not adopted a clear-cut unified policy toward their Iranian neighbor.

More difficult is the deep-seated persistent distrust of the US, apprehension about a greater regional conflict with Iran, and a regional political impetus to demonstrate defiant independence from the US and other western interests. Nationalist writers and some Gulf officials agree on the necessity of the region to become "dependent on themselves” for their defense. Ambivalence in the commentary, however, reveals grudging recognition that the region may ironically need US help to do so. The US multilateral approach, in conjunction with a corresponding GCC show of unity, might help mitigate the stigma seen by some there of cooperating with the US.

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Missile Defense Cooperation Seen as “Litmus Test” for US-Russia Relations

United States | Russia | Strategic Theatre Missile Programs
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
Kommersant (12 Mar. 2012)
BLUF: 
Russian media coverage of prospects for US-Russia cooperation on European missile defense has recently become more cautiously optimistic, although outlets draw a distinct contrast between perceived White House willingness to find a way forward and what is viewed as congressional Republican reluctance to take steps to allay Moscow’s fears.
OBSERVED: 
In the context of the recent nuclear security summit in Seoul and upcoming G8 and NATO summit meetings in May, Russian media has addressed the issue of US-Russian cooperation in the development of a European ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. According to government paper Rossiisskaya Gazeta (RG), Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov referred to such cooperation as the “litmus test that will show if Washington and NATO are ready to view Russia as an equal partner in the construction of a new international security architecture.” In discussing the possibility of cooperation, the press highlighted whether Washington might share secret information about the planned system with Russia, a point of contention between the White House and Congress.

According to Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, some Russian experts viewed talk of the US sharing such information as a disingenuous “game” intended to show the world “how hard the US is trying to smooth relations with Russia” ahead of the NATO summit. A week before Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev were overheard over a "hot mic" discussing post-election “flexibility” in Seoul, the author predicted there would be no moves to assuage the Kremlin’s concerns about the anti-missile system, at least not until after the US elections in November. In contrast, RG reminded readers that the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, signed by President Obama last fall, prevents the US government from sharing sensitive information with another state without the permission of Congress. The daily cited Sergey Koshelev, chief of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, saying that Congress would very likely not allow the White House to reveal any sensitive information, even though the US had been working hard for two years to reach an agreement with Moscow on defense technology cooperation. Though President-elect Vladimir Putin was not planning to attend the NATO summit in Chicago, reportedly due to his busy schedule, RG noted that the Russian army command looked forward to an international conference on missile defense scheduled for May in Moscow, to which all NATO defense ministers had been invited. There, the author said, military experts—as opposed to politicians and diplomats—would have the opportunity for the first time to lead discussions on BMD.

ASSESSMENT: 
Russian coverage of President Obama and US-Russia relations has been relatively favorable recently, with outlets even showing guarded optimism that the two sides could reach an agreement on BMD, despite a limited time frame. Over the past year, there has been a split on this issue within the Russian media, with some outlets reflecting the Kremlin’s concerns that European BMD could undermine the country’s nuclear deterrent capability. Such sources have noted the lack of substance and concrete information in talks of Russia’s possible involvement in the project. More moderate outlets have argued that Moscow’s concerns about a missile shield are unwarranted and that a shift from a Cold War mentality to one that appreciates other threats, such as China, would make for a more cooperative US-Russia relationship.

It should be noted that the siloviki (representatives of the security and military structures) appear to be reconsolidating around President-elect Putin and, according to Dmitry Orlov, head of the Moscow-based Agency for Political and Economic Communication, the appointment of noted US critic Dmitry Rogozin as deputy prime minister in charge of space and defense was “a signal to the West that Russia will be taking a tough stance, first of all on the planned European AMD.” The official position on missile defense and media coverage of it could therefore change in the future.

The “litmus test” comment by Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov was a reference to Russia’s long-standing insistence that the country be accorded respect and treated as an equal partner, especially in matters related to its vital national security. Some in Moscow are concerned that the United States is willing to reduce Russian input on BMD to mere political consent. This concern is magnified by Washington’s refusal to provide Moscow with a written, legal guarantee that a missile defense system would not be used against Russia. As Rogozin said last fall, “Washington has promised us a lot. But we have learned that a promise is not the same as getting married.”
Monitored press portrayed US Republicans, such as House Speaker John Boehner, or Congress as a whole, as creating an obstacle to cooperation on missile defense. In contrast, the White House and figures such as Ambassador Michael McFaul and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Brad Roberts were described as making serious efforts to find a way out of the “dead end” the two countries find themselves in. Throughout 2011, Russian media reflected a tendency within the Russian political leadership toward distrust of “old Republican hawks” who, in their view, continue to view modern Russia through an outdated lens of Cold War phobias. Recent remarks by Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney—to the effect that Russia is America's “enemy number one”—could reinforce this Russian view of the party.
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MUTED COVERAGE OF U.S. RADAR BASE

Iran | United States of America | Turkey | Regional Relations and Stability | Political Stability and Governance | Proliferation | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | Strategic Theatre Missile Programs
Friday, March 9, 2012
Islami Davet (13 Sept. 2011)
BLUF: 
Turkish media commentators have been unusually passive regarding the installation and manning of the new U.S. radar station in Kürecik, Malatya province, a major component of NATO's missile defense system. Curiously light media coverage belies the regional and international strategic importance of what would normally be a controversial issue in Turkey and may be a sign of media self-censorship.
OBSERVED: 
In September 2011, Turkey and the US signed an agreement to install an X-Band early warning radar facility at Kürecik, in the eastern province of Malatya. In late February, it was disclosed publicly that US soldiers had begun to arrive at the radar base, a key component of NATO's missile defense system. Despite brief reports on these developments and some light coverage of local activist protests near the base, Turkish outlets chose not to examine the issue and the story went almost unnoticed by most Turks.

One of the few commentaries to consider in any depth the implications of Turkey's decision to host the radar facility was by Fehim Taştekin, published 29 December 2011 in the liberal newspaper Radikal. In his article, "Radar, the messenger of a war," Taştekin noted the lack of reaction to the decision despite the deployment being part of a “possible war” against Iran, a country with which Turkey had historically maintained peaceful relations. Although the government refused to publicly acknowledge that the radar was built to defend NATO countries--and controversially for many Turks, possibly Israel--from missiles from Iran, Taştekin warned that Turkey risked hostile relations with its neighbors. To Taştekin, tension with Iran, and Turkey's side-taking in both Syria and in the Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq were all signs of a “sad autumn” with regard to Middle East and Turkey relations.

Taştekin acknowledged political benefits for the Turkish government, such as improved relations with the U.S., and reduced pressure regarding damaged Turkey-Israel relations. However, he ultimately argued that Turkey was being taken for "a ride." He points to Russia and its preparations around the Black Sea region in response to threats of an Israeli attack on Iran and raises the argument that Azerbaijan might take advantage of any war to try to take back Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, creating another hot conflict (with likely Russian involvement) near Turkey’s border. The article also notes U.S. “unwillingness” to take up Russia's offer of use of Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan and concludes that the U.S. was exaggerating Iran's threat to NATO nations.

ASSESSMENT: 
As the author of the article cited above acknowledges, the Turkish government decision to host the Kürecik radar station helps ease the recent strain in Turkey's relations with Europe, Israel, and the U.S. It is widely discussed in Turkey that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been losing popularity and prestige in Europe and in the rest of the west. Therefore, it seems like a logical and strategically sound decision for Erdoğan to allow a radar base in Turkey in order to improve his standing, and given his adamant reaction to U.S.-led efforts against Iran's nuclear program in the United Nations, could help restore his reputation as a partner in the eye of U.S. government. Considering the 2003 refusal to allow U.S. soldiers in İncirlik, the opening of the radar base might be considered one of the most important strategic US-Turkey developments in a decade.
Until recently, Erdoğan had been seen as a visionary leader by many in the Middle East. He had garnered praise for close relations with governments around the region, including Israel and Syria, and volunteered to mediate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Erdoğan has seen old friends become his new enemies. First, Turkey's close relation with Israel disintegrated, then relations with Syria soured, and now, relations with Iran are strained due in part to the radar base. These developments could complicate Erdoğan's ambition to make Turkey a "regional power" because Turkey will now be seen as taking sides.
Given widespread and historical popular distrust of the U.S., Fehim Taştekin's article cited above demonstrates how controversial, or at least consequential, the Kürecik radar base could be in the eyes of many Turks (rightly or wrongly). Aside from his piece, however, media reaction has been muted and debate just about non-existent. While small local media outlets have covered ongoing protests by locals and marginal anti-nuclear groups, the mainstream media has apparently decided not to pick up these stories. It is especially striking when contrasted to the extensive coverage and visceral public opposition to deploying U.S. soldiers and a second U.S. base in Turkey ahead of the Iraq war (not to mention the typically anti-Israeli sentiment prevalent in much of Turkish society). 

The dearth of debate could be explained in part by coverage being overshadowed by other major stories: The original U.S.-Turkey agreement coincided with the Van earthquake and the deployment of U.S. soldiers may have been overtaken by coverage of the conflict in Syria. Still, since September, commentary on the subject has been extraordinarily rare.

Given widespread evidence of increasingly heavy handed media intervention by the government, another explanation could be media self censorship. As the government silences its opponents in the media, including detention of outspoken critics, most outlets have begun to apply heavy self censorship, and have clearly been less enthusiastic about opposing or criticizing the government on important controversial issues.

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