China

Russia Turns East: APEC Summit Aftermath

Russia | Regional Relations and Stability | Trade and Regional Relations | Asia | China | Japan
Tuesday, September 25, 2012
Gazeta.ru (7 Sept 2012)
BLUF: 
Russia has been looking to expand avenues for cooperation with Asia, but despite development and investment opportunities, the media remained wary of serious constraints: China’s uneasiness over Russia extending its economic relations to its neighbors, tensions with Japan over the Kuril Islands, and negative domestic attitudes.
OBSERVED: 
At the September APEC summit in Vladivostok, Moscow reiterated its intention to grow its "capital" in the Asia-Pacific (AP) region and strengthen its economic and political presence there. Extensive Russian media coverage of the event represented varied optimistic, cautious, and critical attitudes.

In an interview with Russia Today (RT), Russian President Vladimir Putin described the AP region as “fast and intensively growing” and emphasized that the summit would focus on economic rather than political problems: improving transportation chains and logistics, food security, Russia’s integration into AP markets, investment, and modernization. The Voice of Russia quoted Deputy Director of the Center for Research on APEC Gleb Ivanshentsov who called the summit “the beginning of a big journey” for Russia, comparable to Peter the Great's effort to “cut a window through to Europe” in the early seventeenth century. He also said that the summit had the potential to “open wide the doors for Russia to the Asia-Pacific region.” Ivanshentsov stressed such opportunities as offering AP countries alternative transportation routes to Europe, the potential for grain exports, and cooperation in the energy sector. In an interview with Rossiskaya Gazeta, Andrei Kostin, a member of the Business Consultative Council of Russia, also emphasized how the Chinese and Vietnamese economies were very attractive alternative markets given the ongoing economic crisis in Europe, a view shared by Kommersant Kommersant. Finally, drawing a comparison with western forums, Argumenti Nedeli said that APEC was a unique organization that "sincerely welcomes Russia" and where Russia did not need to "fight" or "defend its interests."

Such optimistic attitudes, however, were tempered by cautious media reminders of the constraints on Russia’s relationships in the AP region. Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenye (NVO) pointed out the complicated fine line of Russian strategy: Balancing relations with China on the one hand, and reaching out to a variety of economies in the region on the other. The latter risks “provoking a negative reaction from China," as it did when the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) signed agreements with New Zealand in 2010. Meanwhile, political analyst Pavel Salin from Global Affairs emphasized the lack of any coherent approach in Russia's inconsistent policy toward the AP region. Analyzing Putin's speech on AP region priorities, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) criticized the president for failing to address topics crucial to investors: development of state institutions and judiciaries, competitiveness, corruption, trade rules, and taxes. Instead, it blamed him for talking about potential areas of cooperation without laying the groundwork for it to happen. Some independent economists assumed that avoiding these “painful issues” demonstrated Putin’s confidence that “his opinion and position will be taken into account anyway.” Finally, political analyst Sergei Karaganov brought up the fear many Russian politicians and citizens have towards China.

Along with these doubts, the Russian media aired domestic criticisms of the cost of the summit, which some outlets considered “unreasonable” in comparison with what Russia stood to gain from it. Gazeta.ru stressed that the approximate cost of the preparations was more than the country’s expenditure for education. In addition, the article noted that the event had not actually provided Russia with any guaranteed benefits. The author argued that Russia's lack of innovation and competitiveness would prevent it from moving deeper into AP markets, and that implementing more “realistic” goals would require major changes in Russian culture and institutions.

ASSESSMENT: 
At the moment, Russian cooperation with its European partners accounts for more than 50 percent of its trade volume, but many there believe that given the EU's uncertain economic prognosis, this volume will stagnate. The Russian government also is not enthusiastic about relations with the U.S. as the two countries have been at odds on various issues and past bilateral talks on modernization and innovation have not yielded positive results. According to Fedor Lukyanov, Russian analyst and editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal, President Putin still feels “deceived by Washington,” because Moscow's gesture of support after 9/11 and the voluntary closing of military facilities in Vietnam and Cuba were not reciprocated by then-US President George W. Bush and he remains skeptical given negative views of Russia in the U.S. Congress. 

Given these circumstances, the “fast growing economies” of the Asian countries justifiably attract Russia’s attention and engender hopes of increasing trade volume in the region, which at the moment accounts for only slightly over 20 percent, with China being a major partner. In addition, Russia has also been looking into reinstating its military base in Vietnam.

Previously, Russia’s moves in the region lacked a systematic approach and produced few encouraging results. The August 2011 visit by North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il, for example, revived Russia’s interest in constructing a pipeline to send gas to South Korea, but the project was dubious considering the unpredictability of North Korean leadership.

Russia’s new “journey” into the AP will require deft diplomatic maneuvering and creativity given the region's disunity and serious territorial disputes, of which Russia is also a part (i.e., the Kuril Islands). However, certain progress was made at the summit, mainly in relations with Japan: The parties signed cooperation agreements and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda was set to visit Russia in December. Considering recent Russia-Japan tensions, Russia may hope this shift could be a promising start towards increasing its regional power, especially with the U.S. and Europe occupied elsewhere. The deep skepticism evident in the Russian media however, suggest Russia's new thrust eastward will not come naturally or easily for the country.

Read More

Thai Military Officials Appear to Temper Enthusiasm for NASA Initiative Ahead of Chinese Defense Chief Visit

United States | Regional Military Cooperation | Regional Relations and Stability | Space | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | China | Thailand
Friday, June 22, 2012
Thai TV3 (18 June 2012)
BLUF: 
Domestic politics, and according to some Thai media, possibly Chinese pressure, has delayed Thailand’s approval of US plans to use the U-Tapao airbase for a major scientific climate study, prompting NASA to demand an answer by 26 June.
OBSERVED: 
News of a 14 June agreement to explore the possibility of using the U-Tapao airbase as a regional logistics hub for US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) set off another firestorm in the Thai press [see US Plans to Increase Use of U-Tapao Naval Base Rouse Thai Media Suspicion]. The deal was reached between Thai Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaiku and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the US-Thailand Strategic Dialogue in Washington. As noted in our earlier analysis, the Thai media has linked the US military’s use of U-Tapao for HADR with the previously announced plan to use the base for NASA to conduct its Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS) atmospheric studies. As observed online, some Thai commentators see both projects as part of a US effort to counterbalance China’s growing regional military power.

On 18 June, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinnawatrat met with Thailand’s armed forces chiefs in Pattaya to discuss these plans for U-Tapao. Although the military top brass reportedly agree that US use of the facility would not affect national security, they were evidently unenthusiastic about the deal as most declined to join PM Yingluck’s media conference after the meeting. Opposition outlets had another field day when they discovered that U-Tapao was not a part of the 19 June Cabinet agenda. They accused the Yingluck government of back-pedaling on the plan, but Yingluck insisted her government had merely tabled the discussion until a working committee delivered its report.

These developments coincided with a visit by Chinese defense chief, Commander of the Second Artillery Force Jing Zhiyuan, on 22 June. The government press release on the visit simply stated that Jing Zhiyuan would meet with Thai Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha to discuss “bilateral military relations,” but the populist Daily News and progressive ​Naewna contended that U-Tapao was on the agenda.

As Thai government and military officials deliberated amid claims of "insufficient information" on NASA's research project and speculation about the US' "real intention for U-Tapao," experts tried to ease public concern by explaining that NASA’s request would benefit Thailand and was unrelated to the US HADR plans. According to scientists from King Mongkut's Institute of Technology (KMIT) Ladkrabang's Chemical Engineering Department, the military had a better understanding of the project than civilian officials. As government approval of NASA's request was delayed, the US agency threatened to withdraw if Bangkok cannot provide an answer by 26 June as NASA needed time to bring in equipment ahead of the studies planned for August.

ASSESSMENT: 
To many Thais, the argument that “US plans for U-Tapao will not impact national security” appears dubious, especially with China's defense chief on his way to Thailand to discuss the bilateral military relationship. Critics of US use of U-Tapao argue that the Thai-US deal has obviously unsettled China and that that possibility alone is enough for the deal to be considered an important matter of national security. In spite of the base's existing use as a logistical hub for the annual Cobra Gold military exercise and de facto humanitarian assistance center for SE Asia, Thais still fear that the deployment of “sophisticated scientific equipment, the hosting of spacecraft, and the arrival of military personnel” on Thai soil could cause problems for Thailand's China relations.

This feeling of unease is exacerbated by the perception that the Yingluck government and US Embassy in Bangkok have so far done a poor job of introducing the proposal to the public, causing much confusion and consternation in many quarters. Further, the apparent attempt by the military leadership to distance themselves from the deal, as evidenced by their lack of enthusiasm and refusal to participate in the joint press conference with PM Yingluck, has already been construed by many as either an attempt to cement the military’s image as the “fence of the country” or to downplay their role in the U-Tapao issue in order to preserve good relations with China.

While most critics still oppose them, scientists and government officials have expressed their approval of NASA's atmospheric studies and have actively encouraged the public to consider all the benefits of the US agency's climate mission. They have asserted that the research data collected in the research will allow meteorologists to make more accurate forecasts and help the Thai government prepare for and possibly mitigate flooding, particularly ahead of the August-October monsoon season.

Judging from comments on social media platforms, Thais are beginning to get a better grasp of NASA's proposal, and despite prevailing and ongoing anti-US sentiment, have begun to worry about missing an opportunity if the government fails to meet NASA’s 26 June deadline.

Younger Thais in particular appear unwilling to forfeit scientific progress and access to quality climate information unprecedented for Thailand. Some Thais online also recognize the possibility that the opposition Democrats party (who supported the plan in 2010) may have blown the U-Tapao issue out of proportion for political gain. Some have called on politicians to stop the political games before the country loses the opportunity to host NASA to Cambodia or Singapore.

Read More

US plans to increase use of U-Tapao naval base rouse Thai media suspicion

United States | Regional Military Cooperation | Trade and Regional Relations | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | China | Thailand
Thursday, June 14, 2012
Luang Lub (7 June 2012)
BLUF: 
News that the US wishes to use the Thai U-Tapao airbase as a logistical hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, coinciding with NASA's plan to use the airport for its atmospheric studies in Southeast Asia, was greeted with suspicion in the conservative Thai press and on social media sites. Most commentators suspected the Pentagon would use U-Tapao as a command center for surveillance operations against China as it expands naval forces in the Pacific region.
OBSERVED: 
The US desire to increase its activity at U-Tapao Thai International Airport in Rayong province was greeted with suspicion in some Thai media. The airport, used heavily by the US during the Vietnam War, and more recently as the logistics hub for the annual combined joint Cobra Gold military training exercises, would serve as a logistical center for US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities in the region. NASA also planned to use the base to conduct its Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC4RS) atmospheric studies.

The 7 June episode of Luang Lub (Thai: Deciphering State Secrets), a television news magazine owned by the conservative and moderately anti-government daily Kom Chad Luek (KCL), analyzed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey's exclusive interview with Suthichai Yoon, a prominent journalist and editor of KC​L's sister publication, the English-daily The Nation. Luang Lub examined an excerpt from the interview, during which General Dempsey confirmed that the US and Thai militaries were “examining concepts” regarding the future use of U-Tapao airbase. He explained that since the airfield was already used for the annual Cobra Gold exercises, it made sense that the US and Thailand would convert U-Tapao into a regional HADR center. Gen. Dempsey reassured Suthichai that the US would not build a permanent base at U-Tapao, and would not use it for “any other military purposes.”

Despite General Dempsey's reassurances, less than two minutes into the interview, Suthichai posited that the US, having access to Clark Air Base in Philippines, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and U-Tapao in Thailand, was formulating a triangular strategy to rebalance US Naval power in the region. Suthichai also questioned Gen. Dempsey over NASA's impending request to use U-Tapao as its base to conduct its SEAC4RS atmospheric studies, which, according to the agency's website, were to take place in August and September. Though General. Dempsey appeared to have fully explained to Suthichai that NASA's project and the Pentagon's plan for U-Tapao were unrelated, the Thai mass media was concerned that, as a part of the US' pivot to Asia policy, the Pentagon planed to establish new US military installations and re-open former bases from the Cold War era. Further, during the one-hour long episode, Luang Lub host Jomquan Laopett discussed the “security concerns” with former Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, Foreign Ministry spokesman Thani Thongphakdi, and opposition Democrat deputy leader Thaworn Saennium. The host also spoke with Defense Minister Air Chief Marshall Sukampol Suwannathat about the lack of transparency of the planned use of U-Tapao by both US military and NASA. The circuitous interview with ACM Sukumpol and his seemingly evasive manner aroused further suspicion in Jomquan, who repeatedly suggested that U-Tapao would revert to a US base, that the presence of US military forces at U-Tapao could cause tension with neighboring countries, and that NASA's atmospheric studies may be used as a cover for the US military.

News of the U-Tapao plans also generated heated discussion on social media websites. For example, a blog post entitled, “How will the US' plan to establish a base at U-Tapao benefit or impact Thailand,” attracted a number of skeptics (and included Nick Ut's famous Associated Press "napalm" photo from the Vietnam War). Posters 14–16 warned that the presence of US troops could threaten relations with China, and turn the area into a terrorist target. Another commentator (8) on the same thread suggested that the US was trying to regain its footing in the region after slowly drifting away over the past decade. In a separate blog post, comment number 14 reminded readers that the US was not well-liked and warned that "Thailand should not do anything to upset China and Myanmar."

ASSESSMENT: 
The bilateral relationship has drifted over the past decade, and the Thai public perception of the US has deteriorated due to mounting trade tensions over intellectual property rights, the failed negotiation of a bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA), and diverging strategic interests. Thailand has also felt snubbed by Washington, holding the view that the US "abandoned” Southeast Asia while conducting the Global War on Terror in the Middle East and resenting how US regional foreign policy has often focused on the Korean Peninsula. Even though U-Tapao has been a de facto hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations over the last several years (including after the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2008 Nargis cyclone in Myanmar, and the 2011 flood in Thailand), many Thais associate U-Tapao with its use by American warplanes flying into combat in Iraq. Thais also remember the base's use during the Vietnam war, and blame the US presence there for the development of some problems near the airbase.

As such, there is a growing distrust among Thais about Washington's “pivot” to Asia policy and US interest in U-Tapao. As shown by the Luang Lub show and Pantip blog posts outlined above, some Thai readers believe the HADR and NASA activities are merely being used by the US as cover for US counterbalancing of China's rising regional military power. Some even revealed that they were conducting research into US defense funding for space programs and the relationship between the US Pentagon and NASA. Many Thais are convinced and worried that U-Tapao will be used for surveillance and military operations against China, the region's rising superpower, and one of Thailand's closest trade and investment partners.

Read More

China responds to US-Japan stationing proposal with naval exercises

Guam | Northern Mariana Islands | United States | Regional Relations and Stability | Regional Military Cooperation | Trade and Regional Relations | China | Japan
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
Sankei Shimbun (17 May 2012)
BLUF: 
According to Japanese Defense Ministry sources, China has directly responded to a recent proposal for the combined stationing and training of US and Japanese forces on US bases in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands by expanding the range of its naval exercises to waters in the vicinity of the islands.
OBSERVED: 
"Until now, they've never come out to this area of the ocean," an unnamed Japanese Defense Ministry official told Sankei Shimbun. Citing the ministry's analysis, the conservative outlet reported that China's aim in expanding the geographic range of its naval exercises to "within several hundred kilometers of the Northern Mariana Islands" is twofold: to strengthen its ability to conduct long-term missions in the open sea as part of its shift from coastal defense to maritime force projection, and to send a message to the US and Japan in response to their combined stationing proposal. [See Exovera's special report, Japan’s new move towards regional defense, for a detailed analysis of the implications of this proposal, which was laid out in last month's US-Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement.]

The Chinese naval exercises, which were also covered by top Japanese television broadcaster NHK, were conducted in the early morning hours of 15 May by two frigates and an Auxiliary General Intelligence (spy) ship, and consisted of the repeated takeoff and landing of a helicopter-type unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from one of the frigates. The three vessels had been in the area since 30 April. Both outlets also noted that beginning on 6 May, a group of five Chinese naval vessels, consisting of missile destroyer(s), frigate(s), and landing craft, also spent several days conducting helicopter exercises about 470 km south of Japan's Okinotori Island.

ASSESSMENT: 
Although the unnamed Defense Ministry official cited by Sankei ​may well be correct that China's naval exercises were intended as a message to Japan, that would qualify as a remarkably subdued reaction from the rising military power--especially when contrasted with China's furious reaction to Japan's September 2010 arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain off the Senkaku Islands. However, at this point the US and Japan have only agreed to consider the combined stationing and training proposal. According to the joint statement, the two sides agreed to "identify specific areas of cooperation in this regard by the end of 2012." China is likely to have a stronger reaction if and when the US and Japan finalize and begin to implement such plans.
After an initial flurry of strong editorial reactions to the combined stationing and training proposal, coverage of and commentary about the proposal in the Japanese press has been remarkably sparse. However, this is not without precedent: Japanese coverage of security issues tends to be driven by official announcements, and there have been no such announcements since the "2+2" meeting of the two nations' foreign and defense ministers. The debate is likely to be rekindled when the Japanese government begins to conduct the review of the proposal required by the joint statement.
Read More

Japanese debate security cooperation with US to counter China

Guam | Northern Mariana Islands | United States | Regional Military Cooperation | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | China | Japan
Thursday, May 3, 2012
BLUF: 
 A pair of new initiatives laid out in last week’s US-Japan 2+2 joint statement--in particular, the potential stationing of combined Japanese and US troops on US bases in the western Pacific--has become the focus of a major debate in Japan about whether the Noda administration has gone too far in siding with the US against China.
OBSERVED: 
On Monday (30 April), Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda became the first DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) prime minister to make an official visit to Washington, DC. His visit came just days after the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (SCC), comprised of the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers, issued a major joint statement. The morning after Noda’s visit, Japan’s preeminent liberal newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, came out swinging.

The target of Asahi's ire was two new initiatives laid out in the joint SCC statement: the potential semi-permanent combined stationing of members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) together with US forces in shared-use facilities in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands for the purpose of conducting combined exercises, and the “strategic” use of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to provide key items like patrol boats to the Philippines and other coastal states in the region. Although the joint statement never mentioned China, Asahi had no doubt about the target of these new initiatives. “This kind of Japan-US cooperation no doubt conforms to US strategy towards China,” it argued. “But what about Japan? What advantage is there for Japan to participate in exercises aimed at deterrence in the waters near Guam?”

The widely read daily was equally critical of the new idea of “strategic” ODA. “Doesn’t the provision of patrol boats betray the fundamental ODA principle of avoiding military objectives? When they were provided to Indonesia in 2006, it was in the name of countering piracy in the Strait of Malacca. What’s the objective this time?”
Asahi’s critique was echoed by other liberal Japanese outlets, like the Chunichi Shimbun, which warned that stationing SDF forces in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands could backfire and result in increased regional military tensions. Chunichi ​also raised constitutional concerns: "Wouldn't exercises based on long-term overseas stationing of SDF members make them [constitutionally forbidden] 'overseas troops'?"

On the other side of the debate, conservative newspapers welcomed the proposed initiatives, with the Yomiuri Shimbun calling them “highly significant for deepening defense cooperation,” and the far-right Sankei Shimbun crowing that “these join t exercise locations will be nearly permanent, indicating a move in the direction of joint Japanese-US defense of the Asia-Pacific.”

ASSESSMENT: 
When the DPJ swept to power in 2009 after more than 50 years of nearly unbroken conservative LDP rule, many observers in the US worried that Japan might start shifting closer toward China and away from the US. These concerns grew as DPJ heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa promptly led a group of over 140 DPJ Diet members on a trip to Beijing, while Prime Minister Hatoyama floated the idea of an East Asian Community without the US and pushed hard for the US to agree to change the joint plan to relocate the Futenma Marine base within Okinawa.

Three years later, Japan is already on its third DPJ prime minister, and it is firmly back in the US orbit. Japan has gone through six prime ministers in six years and shows no signs of slowing down, so a stable, long-term Japanese defense policy can only be based on strong public support and understanding.  A robust debate within Japan over national defense should therefore be a welcome development to all outside observers.

This new debate over overseas stationing and strategic ODA initiatives goes to the heart of the security dilemma facing Japan: How should Japan adapt to the rise of China and the changing security situation in East Asia? As the US pivots toward Asia, should Japan double down and expand the regional scope of its defense cooperation with the US, even at the risk of provoking China, or should it try to strike a balance between the two great powers? The Noda administration has clearly decided on its response: it is intent on implementing a more broad-based defense cooperation with the US. The fact that this nominally left-wing DPJ administration is now being supported by Yomiuri and Sankei and harshly criticized by Asahi is a testament to the party’s evolution over the three years that it has been in power.

Watch for our upcoming Exovera special report on this new debate and how it reflects Japan's changing security security environment.

Read More

Shanmugam, Rudd weigh Sino-US tension, potential for regional peace

Asia | China | Regional Relations and Stability
Monday, February 13, 2012
Kathmandu Post (12 Feb. 2012)
BLUF: 
The foreign ministers of Singapore and Australia separately articulated an evolving regional desire to prevent the polarization of Asia into Chinese and American blocs.
OBSERVED: 
The 1-8 February introductory visit of Singapore’s Foreign Minister Kasiviswanathan (“K”) Shanmugam to the United States sustained a steady volume of coverage in Singapore’s state-influenced Straits Times. Times coverage largely served to amplify Shanmugam’s primary talking points, which called on Washington to affect an “economic pivot” toward greater trade and engagement with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states while abstaining from public rhetoric that perpetuates the perception of Sino-US relations as a zero-sum contest, wherein US engagement in Asia could be interpreted as a policy of containment of China’s emergence. Shanmugam’s comments warning the US against “anti-China” rhetoric were widely disseminated throughout regional media via wire reports. Straits Times defense correspondent Jermyn Chow featured the excerpted comments of Singapore's Minister of State for Defense (and Education) Lawrence Wong (delivered in the keynote address of the Asia-Pacific Security Conference 2012, held 12-13 February in Singapore) in a 14 February article ("Asian nations 'won't want to take sides' in a Sino-US row"), wherein Wong expounded at some length upon the themes that Shanmugam expressed during his US visit.

Separately, Australia’s Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd authored an opinion piece carried in the 9 February editions of the (Hong Kong-based) South China Morning Post and the Bangkok Post, as well as the 10 February edition of the Straits Times and the 13 February edition of the Kathmandu Post, wherein Rudd outlined the challenges of creating a “Pax Pacifica.” Rudd argued that the breadth of Asia’s economic dynamism allowed the Asian community to reject a “Sino-American duopoly” as the structural basis for regional relations, calling instead for a framework based on collective security that would provide regional stability capable of weathering fluctuations in Sino-American relations.

ASSESSMENT: 
Following President Obama’s declaration at the sixth East Asia Summit (18-19 November 2011 in Bali, Indonesia) that the US would “pivot” foreign policy priorities away from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and focus instead on Asia, media throughout Asia have, in mainstream reporting and on op-ed pages, explored and developed the narrative of containment vis-à-vis the US relationship with China. US actions such as the creation of a permanent US military presence in Darwin, Australia, the provision of naval vessels to the Philippines, and the expansion of military exercises such as Cobra Gold to include several nations with claims on disputed territories in the South China Sea have all been largely interpreted in regional media through the lens of the containment narrative. The recent messages of Shanmugam and Rudd are aimed squarely at reclaiming and reshaping the regional conversation on security structures, and guarding against the possibility that the perception of containment and conflict would become reality. Shanmugam and Rudd clearly timed their appeals with an eye toward influencing the diplomatic exchange between Chinese vice president (and "leader-in-waiting") Xi Jinping and President Obama, as Xi began his week-long US visit on 14 February.   
Read More

Exit Stage Left: The Regional Implications of a Chavez Loss in October

Brazil | Colombia | Cuba | Ecuador | Haiti | Iran | Bolivia | Peru | Russia | Regional Relations and Stability | China | Latin America and The Caribbean
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
El Tiempo (12 Feb. 2012)
BLUF: 
As a potential glimpse into the region’s future without Chavez, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles’ upcoming regional tour will likely be of high interest to the Latin American press. Such a scenario could drive embattled allies of Chavez’s anti-US block further toward China, Russia and Iran, solidify Peru’s course toward a center-left “Lula model,” and leave Brazil as the big winner in the scramble to fill the void of regional influence left by Chavez’s potential exit.
OBSERVED: 
The surprising turnout for Venezuela’s opposition primaries heightened speculation about the future of the President Hugo Chavez’s “Bolivarian Project’ inside the country. However, winner Henrique Capriles also raised an important question for the region with his announcement Monday that he was planning his first international campaign tour: How might his election in October change the dynamic of a Latin American left potentially left rudderless without its longtime leader.

Although initial commentary around Latin America has primarily focused on what Capriles’ nomination meant to the revitalization of democracy in Venezuela, his upcoming regional tour will bring more attention to his planned changes to Venezuelan foreign policy. In particular, Capriles has stated that he intends to discard the “spent” discourse of anti-imperialism, “de-politicize” the country’s oil industry and review current contracts, and rethink agreements Chavez signed with China and Russia.

The most immediate impact of a new administration in Venezuela could be felt by members of the Chavez-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Speaking to reporters the day after the primary, Capriles announced that he would cease aid to countries ruled by Chavez’s “international club of friends,” such as Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Claiming that $70 billion in Venezuelan oil revenues had been transferred to Chavez’s ideological allies via cheap oil, infrastructure projects, and indirect and direct financial support, Capriles insisted that--unlike Chavez--he would “not use oil to make them speak well of me in another country.”

ASSESSMENT: 
The tremendous effect of losing both the hefty financial and ideological backing of their primary patron would undoubtedly have severe economic and political repercussions for the more devout (and dependent) members of the anti-US ALBA block, leading them to seek closer ties and increased aid from China, Russia, and Iran. In addition, perceptions that ALBA may be left relatively toothless without Chavez’s considerable petrodollars could affect the direction of Haiti's recovery efforts. In recent weeks, President Michel Martelly’s consideration of joining the alliance has triggered media speculation over whether he’ll choose the “leftist path” in the country’s rebuilding project. In Peru, previous fears that the country would drift into ALBA's orbit have abated, but President Ollanta Humala has been repeatedly dogged by allegations of chavista sympathies. The absence of Chavez from the regional scene could be a political boon for the new leader, simultaneously allaying concerns in the conservative press of “Bolivarian encroachment” and allowing Humala himself to focus more intently on his stated priority of expanding relations with Brazil. 
It is in Brazil and Colombia where Capriles’ statements on his tour will likely garner the most media attention. In Bogota, President Juan Manuel Santos has already successfully gambled by seeking rapprochement with Venezuela during the first 18 months of his term. However, his initial positive returns in media approval have been threatened recently as commentators questioned the sincerity of Chavez’s gestures after ALBA threatened to “torpedo” Colombia’s hosting of the April 2012 Summit of the Americas with a boycott if Cuba was not invited. Weary of the ongoing diplomatic tensions with their neighbor over the past 13 years, particularly those involving alleged Venezuelan support for the FARC, the Colombian media would embrace a true fulfillment of the oft-discussed “brotherly” relations between the two Andean neighbors, likely crediting Santos for laying the foundation through his reconciliatory gestures during the Chavez administration. Capriles’ promise of “absolute collaboration” on security issues and his criticism of the current lack of transparency in “relations with guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug trafficking” would also find an eager audience with the Colombian media. Furthermore, such a strengthening in ideological ties could place welcome pressure on Rafael Correa's administration in Ecuador and its handling of similar matters.
However, it is Brazil that potentially stands to gain the most if Chavez is seen to be faltering. Capriles tellingly chose the country as the launching point of his tour and also followed the successful campaign footsteps of Peru’s Humala with his pledge to follow the “Brazilian model,” earning widespread attention across the Brazilian press. With Capriles in lockstep beside her, rather than Chavez tugging at the reins, President Dilma Rousseff could assert Brazil’s primacy in regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the fledgling Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). A waning Chavez would also bring to the forefront three regional issues the Brazilian press sees as key opportunities for realizing Brazil's role as the regional leader: Cuba's transition, Haiti's recovery, and Colombia's internal conflict with the FARC. In particular, the press views Cuba as a high profile international problem that could propel Brazil to greater global influence, and the loss of the Castro's primary benefactor would likely trigger immediate and intense media pressure for Rousseff to fill the vacuum and adjust her controversial policy toward human rights on the island.
Read More