Guam

US Marine exercise welcomed by Northern Marianas

Guam | Northern Mariana Islands | United States | Japan
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
Marianas Variety (24 May 2012)
BLUF: 
Operation Geiger Fury (OGF), the largest US military exercise to be conducted in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) in decades, has garnered an overwhelmingly positive response from local officials and media, although an undercurrent of resentment at the long years of neglect remains. The US decision to move forward with the exercise on the CNMI reflects the fact that the strategic profile of the islands - which played a key role in WWII, and which are now located at the intersection of expanding Chinese naval activity and the rebalancing of US forces - is rising again.
OBSERVED: 
US Marine Operation Geiger Fury (OGF), has been enthusiastically embraced by the local press in the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The training exercise, which began on 15 May and were to run through 8 June, involves about 200 Marines from Marine Aircraft Group-12 conducting expeditionary operations and rehabilitating the North airfield on Tinian Island - an island that, local press coverage frequently notes, had "the world’s busiest operational airbase with four parallel runways of 8,000 feet in length" during WWII.

Before the exercises, local public frustration about the lack of use of the large portion of Tinian Island leased by the US Defense Department had been running high. On 27 February, CNMI Governor Benigno R. Fitial sent a letter to US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta asking to renegotiate the 100 year lease on land covering 65 percent of the area of Tinian Island because the department had not developed the area 35 years after the lease began. After a minor backlash, the Governor backed off slightly, calling the letter "tongue-in-cheek." However, his frustration appeared to be widely shared, with even enthusiastic local officials on Tinian Island including words like "finally" and "it's about time" in their comments on the start of Operation Geiger Fury.

Local media reports have also highlighted a new proposal for the combined stationing and training of Japanese and US troops on Tinian Island. [For an in-depth analysis of this proposal, see Exovera's special report.] A fact-finding mission by a nine member delegation from Japan's Ministry of Defense to Tinian Island garnered widepread local coverage. Tinian Mayor Ramon Dela Cruz was particularly enthusiastic about the prospect after meeting with the delegation. He praised not only the potential positive economic benefit, but also the historic impact of such a move: “If the Japanese Self Defense Force and the Americans train together as allies, this will be history in the making. They were once bitter enemies during the war and now they are coming back as allies to preserve security in the region. […] Now we are the strongest of allies. It would be historic and heartwarming to see American Marines and Japanese soldiers training side-by-side on Tinian today.”

ASSESSMENT: 
The highly positive local coverage and reaction from local officials to both Operation Geiger Fury and the prospect of combined Japanese-US troop stationing and training is understandable, given the dire financial straits faced by the CNMI. The CNMI’s finances are in such disarray that on 17 April its public pension agency became the first such agency on US soil to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. An economic analysis of Guam and the CNMI released last December added to the gloomy picture: tourism is down, fuel, shipping and labor costs are up, inflation is rising steadily, and both the population and the Gross Island Product of the CMNI are declining. Against this dire backdrop, any potential local opposition to US (and possibly Japanese) plans for a military buildup on the leased portion of Tinian Island is likely to be minimal.
Operation Geiger Fury and discussions between the US and Japan about using Tinian Island as a potential site for combined military stationing and training reflect the growing strategic significance of Guam and the Northern Marianas. China's rapidly growing Navy has pursued a long-term anti-access/area-denial strategy. They have begun to move beyond what Chinese strategists call their "first island chain" connecting Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, and are now increasingly active in the area leading up to their "second island chain" stretching north to south from the Kurile Islands to Indonesia. Meanwhile, the US has begun a rebalancing of its global force posture, increasing its focus on Asia while shifting thousands of troops away from Okinawa to Guam, Australia, and Hawaii. Guam and the the Northern Mariana Islands fall squarely on the strategists' "second island chain," and thus at the intersection of these two larger trends.

In a hypothetical outbreak of hostility between the US and China, a substantial US military presence on Tinian Island - especially if combined with a Japanese military presence - could make the Northern Mariana Islands vulnerable to Chinese attack. However, in the minds of local residents and officials, the immediate and concrete economic benefits that would accrue to the local economy from the presence of US and Japanese forces are likely to far outweigh the risk of any such worst-case scenario. The US and Japan are thus unlikely to face significant local opposition should they choose to move forward with the combined stationing proposal.

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China responds to US-Japan stationing proposal with naval exercises

Guam | Northern Mariana Islands | United States | Regional Relations and Stability | Regional Military Cooperation | Trade and Regional Relations | China | Japan
Tuesday, May 22, 2012
Sankei Shimbun (17 May 2012)
BLUF: 
According to Japanese Defense Ministry sources, China has directly responded to a recent proposal for the combined stationing and training of US and Japanese forces on US bases in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands by expanding the range of its naval exercises to waters in the vicinity of the islands.
OBSERVED: 
"Until now, they've never come out to this area of the ocean," an unnamed Japanese Defense Ministry official told Sankei Shimbun. Citing the ministry's analysis, the conservative outlet reported that China's aim in expanding the geographic range of its naval exercises to "within several hundred kilometers of the Northern Mariana Islands" is twofold: to strengthen its ability to conduct long-term missions in the open sea as part of its shift from coastal defense to maritime force projection, and to send a message to the US and Japan in response to their combined stationing proposal. [See Exovera's special report, Japan’s new move towards regional defense, for a detailed analysis of the implications of this proposal, which was laid out in last month's US-Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement.]

The Chinese naval exercises, which were also covered by top Japanese television broadcaster NHK, were conducted in the early morning hours of 15 May by two frigates and an Auxiliary General Intelligence (spy) ship, and consisted of the repeated takeoff and landing of a helicopter-type unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from one of the frigates. The three vessels had been in the area since 30 April. Both outlets also noted that beginning on 6 May, a group of five Chinese naval vessels, consisting of missile destroyer(s), frigate(s), and landing craft, also spent several days conducting helicopter exercises about 470 km south of Japan's Okinotori Island.

ASSESSMENT: 
Although the unnamed Defense Ministry official cited by Sankei ​may well be correct that China's naval exercises were intended as a message to Japan, that would qualify as a remarkably subdued reaction from the rising military power--especially when contrasted with China's furious reaction to Japan's September 2010 arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain off the Senkaku Islands. However, at this point the US and Japan have only agreed to consider the combined stationing and training proposal. According to the joint statement, the two sides agreed to "identify specific areas of cooperation in this regard by the end of 2012." China is likely to have a stronger reaction if and when the US and Japan finalize and begin to implement such plans.
After an initial flurry of strong editorial reactions to the combined stationing and training proposal, coverage of and commentary about the proposal in the Japanese press has been remarkably sparse. However, this is not without precedent: Japanese coverage of security issues tends to be driven by official announcements, and there have been no such announcements since the "2+2" meeting of the two nations' foreign and defense ministers. The debate is likely to be rekindled when the Japanese government begins to conduct the review of the proposal required by the joint statement.
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Japanese debate security cooperation with US to counter China

Guam | Northern Mariana Islands | United States | Regional Military Cooperation | U.S. Coalition Military Operations and Diplomacy | China | Japan
Thursday, May 3, 2012
BLUF: 
 A pair of new initiatives laid out in last week’s US-Japan 2+2 joint statement--in particular, the potential stationing of combined Japanese and US troops on US bases in the western Pacific--has become the focus of a major debate in Japan about whether the Noda administration has gone too far in siding with the US against China.
OBSERVED: 
On Monday (30 April), Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda became the first DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) prime minister to make an official visit to Washington, DC. His visit came just days after the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (SCC), comprised of the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers, issued a major joint statement. The morning after Noda’s visit, Japan’s preeminent liberal newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, came out swinging.

The target of Asahi's ire was two new initiatives laid out in the joint SCC statement: the potential semi-permanent combined stationing of members of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) together with US forces in shared-use facilities in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands for the purpose of conducting combined exercises, and the “strategic” use of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to provide key items like patrol boats to the Philippines and other coastal states in the region. Although the joint statement never mentioned China, Asahi had no doubt about the target of these new initiatives. “This kind of Japan-US cooperation no doubt conforms to US strategy towards China,” it argued. “But what about Japan? What advantage is there for Japan to participate in exercises aimed at deterrence in the waters near Guam?”

The widely read daily was equally critical of the new idea of “strategic” ODA. “Doesn’t the provision of patrol boats betray the fundamental ODA principle of avoiding military objectives? When they were provided to Indonesia in 2006, it was in the name of countering piracy in the Strait of Malacca. What’s the objective this time?”
Asahi’s critique was echoed by other liberal Japanese outlets, like the Chunichi Shimbun, which warned that stationing SDF forces in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands could backfire and result in increased regional military tensions. Chunichi ​also raised constitutional concerns: "Wouldn't exercises based on long-term overseas stationing of SDF members make them [constitutionally forbidden] 'overseas troops'?"

On the other side of the debate, conservative newspapers welcomed the proposed initiatives, with the Yomiuri Shimbun calling them “highly significant for deepening defense cooperation,” and the far-right Sankei Shimbun crowing that “these join t exercise locations will be nearly permanent, indicating a move in the direction of joint Japanese-US defense of the Asia-Pacific.”

ASSESSMENT: 
When the DPJ swept to power in 2009 after more than 50 years of nearly unbroken conservative LDP rule, many observers in the US worried that Japan might start shifting closer toward China and away from the US. These concerns grew as DPJ heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa promptly led a group of over 140 DPJ Diet members on a trip to Beijing, while Prime Minister Hatoyama floated the idea of an East Asian Community without the US and pushed hard for the US to agree to change the joint plan to relocate the Futenma Marine base within Okinawa.

Three years later, Japan is already on its third DPJ prime minister, and it is firmly back in the US orbit. Japan has gone through six prime ministers in six years and shows no signs of slowing down, so a stable, long-term Japanese defense policy can only be based on strong public support and understanding.  A robust debate within Japan over national defense should therefore be a welcome development to all outside observers.

This new debate over overseas stationing and strategic ODA initiatives goes to the heart of the security dilemma facing Japan: How should Japan adapt to the rise of China and the changing security situation in East Asia? As the US pivots toward Asia, should Japan double down and expand the regional scope of its defense cooperation with the US, even at the risk of provoking China, or should it try to strike a balance between the two great powers? The Noda administration has clearly decided on its response: it is intent on implementing a more broad-based defense cooperation with the US. The fact that this nominally left-wing DPJ administration is now being supported by Yomiuri and Sankei and harshly criticized by Asahi is a testament to the party’s evolution over the three years that it has been in power.

Watch for our upcoming Exovera special report on this new debate and how it reflects Japan's changing security security environment.

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